Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Grennan, Matthew
• 署名单位: University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.1.145
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 145-177
• 关键词: health; consolidation; TRANSPARENCY; incentives; models

摘要

Many important issues in business-to-business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices, situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous. This paper uses new panel data on buyer-supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market. While many phenomena that restrict different prices to different buyers are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs (e. g., mergers, group purchasing organizations, and transparency), I find that: (i) more uniform pricing works against hospitals by softening competition; and (ii) results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect. (JEL C78, L13, L14, L64)