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作者：Freyaldenhoven, Simon; Hansen, Christian; Shapiro, Jesse M.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of Chicago; Brown University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We consider a linear panel event-study design in which unobserved confounds may be related both to the outcome and to the policy variable of interest. We provide sufficient conditions to identify the causal effect of the policy by exploiting covariates related to the policy only through the confounds. Our model implies a set of moment equations that are linear in parameters. The effect of the policy can be estimated by 2SLS, and causal inference is valid even when endogeneity leads to pre-even...
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作者：Lieber, Ethan M. J.; Lockwood, Lee M.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; University of Virginia; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Making a transfer in kind reduces its value to recipients but can improve targeting. We develop an approach to quantiffing this trade-off and apply it to home care. Using randomized experiments by Medicaid, we find that in-kind provision significantly reduces the value of the transfer to recipients while targeting a small fraction of the eligible population that is sicker and has fewer informal care-givers than the average eligible. Under a wide range of assumptions within a standard model, th...
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作者：Gathergood, John; Mahoney, Neale; Stewart, Neil; Weber, Jorg
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of Chicago; University of Warwick
摘要：We study how individuals repay their debt using linked data on multiple credit cards. Repayments are not allocated to the higher interest rate card, which would minimize the cost of borrowing. Moreover, the degree of misallocation is invariant to the economic stakes, which is inconsistent with optimization frictions. Instead, we show that repayments are consistent with a balance-matchingheuristic under which the share of repayments on each card is matched to the share of balances on each card....
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作者：Davis, Donald R.; Dingel, Jonathan I.
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：Leading empiricists and theorists of cities have recently argued that the generation and exchange of ideas must play a more central role in the analysis of cities. This paper develops the first system of cities model with costly idea exchange as the agglomeration force. The model replicates a broad set of established facts about the cross section of cities. It provides the first spatial equilibrium theory of why skill premia are higher in larger cities and how variation in these premia emerges...
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作者：Dal Bo, Pedro; Frechette, Guillaume
作者单位：Brown University; New York University
摘要：We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects' strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring. We find that three simple strategies represent the majority of the chosen strategies: Always Defect, Tit-for-Tat, and Grim. In addition, we identify how the strategies systematically vary with the parameters of the game. Finally, we use the elicited strategies to test the ability to recover strategies using statistical methods based on obse...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Mierendorff, Konrad
作者单位：Columbia University; University of London; University College London
摘要：We consider a decision maker (DM) who, before taking an action, seeks information by allocating her limited attention dynamically over different news sources that are biased toward alternative actions. Endogenous choice of information generates rich dynamics: the chosen news source either reinforces or weakens the prior, shaping subsequent attention choices, belief updating, and the final action. The DM adopts a learning strategy biased toward the current belief when the belief is extreme and ...
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作者：Lin, Tse-Chun; Liu, Qi; Sun, Bo
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Peking University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：We study the effect of financial market frictions on managerial compensation. We embed a market microstructure model into an otherwise standard contracting framework, and analyze optimal pay for-performance when managers use information they learn from the market in their investment decisions. In a less frictional market, the improved information content of stock prices helps guide manage-rial decisions and thereby necessitates lower-powered compensation. Exploiting a randomized experiment, we...
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作者：Adam, Klaus; Weber, Henning
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Deutsche Bundesbank
摘要：Sticky price models featuring heterogeneous firms and systematic firm-level productivity trends deliver radically different predictions for the optimal inflation rate than their popular homogenous-firm counterparts: (i) the optimal steady-state inflation rate generically differs from zero and (ii) inflation optimally responds to productivity disturbances. We show this by aggregating a heterogeneous-firm model with sticky prices in closed form. Using firm-level data from the US Census Bureau, w...
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作者：Casaburi, Lorenzo; Macchiavello, Rocco
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Despite extensive evidence that preferences are often time-inconsistent, there is only scarce evidence of willingness to pay for commitment. Infrequent payments for frequently provided goods and services are a common feature of many markets and they may naturally provide commitment to save for lumpy expenses. Multiple experiments in the Kenyan dairy sector show that: i) farmers are willing to incur sizable costs to receive infrequent payments as a commitment device, ii) poor contract enforceme...
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作者：Agarwal, Nikhil; Ashlagi, Itai; Azevedo, Eduardo; Featherstone, Clayton R.; Karaduman, Omer
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We show that kidney exchange markets suffer from market failures whose remedy could increase transplants by 30 to 63 percent. First, we document that the market is fragmented and inefficient; most transplants are arranged by hospitals instead of national platforms. Second, we propose a model to show two sources of inefficiency: hospitals only partly internalize their patients' benefits from exchange, and current platforms suboptimally reward hospitals for submitting patients and donors. Third,...
