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作者：Caselli, Francesco; Ciccone, Antonio
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Mannheim; Barcelona School of Economics; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：Jones (2014) examines development accounting with imperfect substitutability between different types of skills in the production of output. He finds that human capital variation can account for the totality of the variation in income across countries. We show that this finding is entirely due to an assumption that the relative wage of skilled workers is solely determined by attributes of workers (once the supply of skilled workers is accounted for). If skill premia are predominantly determined...
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作者：Rao, Gautam
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：I exploit a natural experiment in Indian schools to study how being integrated with poor students affects the social behaviors and academic outcomes of rich students. Using administrative data, lab and field experiments to measure outcomes, I find that having poor classmates makes rich students (i) more prosocial, generous, and egalitarian; and (ii) less likely to discriminate against poor students, and more willing to socialize with them. These effects are driven by personal interactions betw...
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作者：De Groote, Olivier; Verboven, Frank
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; KU Leuven; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We study a generous program to promote the adoption of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems through subsidies on future electricity production, rather than through upfront investment subsidies. We develop a tractable dynamic model of new technology adoption, also accounting for local market heterogeneity. We identify the discount factor from demand responses to variation that shifts expected future but not current utilities. Despite the massive adoption, we find that households significantly discou...
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作者：Kurlat, Pablo
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：I study expertise acquisition in a model of trading under asymmetric information. I propose and implement a method to measure r, the ratio of the marginal social value to the marginal private value of expertise. This can be decomposed into three sufficient statistics: traders' average profits, the fraction of bad assets among traded assets, and the elasticity of good assets traded with respect to capital inflows. I measure r = 0.16 for the junk bond underwriting market. Since this is less than...
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作者：Coibion, Olivier; Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Hong, Gee Hee
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; International Monetary Fund
摘要：We address how using different censoring thresholds and imputation procedures affects the baseline results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015). Higher censoring thresholds introduce measurement error and outliers that generate wide variability in results across weighting schemes, but methods that explicitly control for outliers confirm the results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015) for all censoring thresholds. We also illustrate how the BIS's approach to imputing missing prices...
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作者：Borenstein, Severin; Bushnell, James; Wolak, Frank A.; Zaragoza-Watkins, Matthew
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Davis; Stanford University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We study potential equilibria in California's cap-and-trade market for greenhouse gases (GHGs) based on information available before the market started. We find large ex ante uncertainty in business-as-usual emissions and in the abatement that might result from non-market policies, much larger than the reduction that could plausibly occur in response to an allowance price within a politically acceptable range. This implies that the market price is very likely to be determined by an administrat...
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作者：Andrews, Isaiah; Kasy, Maximilian
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：Some empirical results are more likely to be published than others. Selective publication leads to biased estimates and distorted inference. We propose two approaches for identifying the conditional probability of publication as a function of a study's results, the first based on systematic replication studies and the second on meta-studies. For known conditional publication probabilities, we propose bias-corrected estimators and confidence sets. We apply our methods to recent replication stud...
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作者：Dizon-Ross, Rebecca
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：Schools worldwide distribute information to parents about their children's academic performance. Do frictions prevent parents, particularly low-income parents, from accessing this information to make decisions? A field experiment in Malawi shows that, at baseline, parents' beliefs about their children's academic performance are often inaccurate. Providing parents with clear, digestible performance information causes them to update their beliefs and adjust their investments: they increase the s...
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作者：Frechette, Guillaume R.; Lizzeri, Alessandro; Salz, Tobias
作者单位：New York University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper presents a dynamic equilibrium model of a taxi market. The model is estimated using data from New York City yellow cabs. Two salient features by which most taxi markets deviate from the efficient market ideal are, first, matching frictions created by the need for both market sides to physically search for trading partners, and second, regulatory limitations to entry. to assess the importance of these features, we use the model to simulate the effect of changes in entry, alternative ...
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作者：Malenko, Andrey; Tsoy, Anton
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In many cases, buyers are not informed about their valuations and rely on experts, who are informed but biased for overbidding. We study auction design when selling to such advised buyers. We show that a canonical dynamic auction, the English auction, has a natural equilibrium that outperforms standard static auctions in expected revenues and allocative efficiency. The ability to Communicate as the auction proceeds allows for more informative communication and gives advisors the ability to per...
