Demand and Supply of Infrequent Payments as a Commitment Device: Evidence from Kenya

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Casaburi, Lorenzo; Macchiavello, Rocco
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180281
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 523-555
• 关键词: field experiment; self-control; rotating savings; credit; POOR; constraints; Microcredit; ECONOMICS; dont; save

摘要

Despite extensive evidence that preferences are often time-inconsistent, there is only scarce evidence of willingness to pay for commitment. Infrequent payments for frequently provided goods and services are a common feature of many markets and they may naturally provide commitment to save for lumpy expenses. Multiple experiments in the Kenyan dairy sector show that: i) farmers are willing to incur sizable costs to receive infrequent payments as a commitment device, ii) poor contract enforcement, however, limits competition among buyers in the supply of infrequent payments. We then present a model of demand and supply of infrequent payments and test its additional predictions.