Strategy Choice in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dal Bo, Pedro; Frechette, Guillaume
• 署名单位: Brown University; New York University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181480
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 3929-3952
• 关键词: Repeated games; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; equilibrium; RECIPROCITY; demand; play

摘要

We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects' strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring. We find that three simple strategies represent the majority of the chosen strategies: Always Defect, Tit-for-Tat, and Grim. In addition, we identify how the strategies systematically vary with the parameters of the game. Finally, we use the elicited strategies to test the ability to recover strategies using statistical methods based on observed round-by-round cooperation choices and find that this can be done fairly well, but only under certain conditions.