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作者：Allen, Robert C.; Bertazzini, Mattia C.; Heldring, Leander
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Northwestern University
摘要：We test between cooperative and extractive theories of the origins of government. We use river shifts in southern Iraq as a natural experiment, in a new archeological panel dataset. A shift away creates a local demand for a government to coordinate because private river irrigation needs to be replaced with public canals. It disincentivizes local extraction as land is no longer productive without irrigation. Consistent with a cooperative theory of government, a river shift away led to state for...
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作者：Delacretaz, David; Kominers, Scott Duke; Teytelboym, Alexander
作者单位：University of Manchester; Harvard University; Harvard University; University of Oxford
摘要：Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the prefer-ences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We intro-duce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of refugee families and the capacities of communities. We propose four refugee resettlement mechanisms and two solution concepts that can be used in refugee resettlement matching under various institutional and informational cons...
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作者：Brot-Goldberg, Zarek; Layton, Timothy; Vabson, Boris; Wang, Adelina Yanyue
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; McKinsey & Company
摘要：We show in two natural experiments that default rules in Medicare Part D have large, persistent effects on enrollment and drug utili-zation of low-income beneficiaries. The implications of this phe-nomenon for welfare and optimal policy depend on the sensitivity of passivity to the value of the default option. Using random assignment to default options, we show that beneficiary passivity is extremely insensitive, even when enrolling in the default option would result in substantial drug consum...
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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Strack, Philipp; Zhang, Mengxi
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; University of Bonn; Yale University
摘要：We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance prob-lem under adverse selection (see Stiglitz 1977) where we allow for a random distribution of losses , possibly correlated with the agent's risk parameter that is private information. Our model explains pat-terns of observed customer behavior and predicts insurance con-tracts most often observed in practice: these consist of menus of several deductible-premium pairs or menus of insurance with cov-erage limits-premium pairs. A mai...
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作者：Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Orhun, Yesim; Raymond, Collin
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland Baltimore; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Cornell University
摘要：We examine whether people have an intrinsic preference for nega-tively skewed or positively skewed information structures and how these preferences relate to intrinsic preferences for informativeness. The results from lab experiments show a strong intrinsic preference for positively skewed information and suggest that providing such information can improve information uptake. Evidence from field studies in decision-and ego-relevant contexts replicates these find-ings. We discuss our findings t...
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作者：Bhaskar, Dhruva; Mcclellan, Andrew; Sadler, Evan
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); University of Chicago; Columbia University
摘要：Regulators often impose rules that constrain the behavior of market participants. We study the design of regulatory policy in an insurance market as a delegation problem. A regulator restricts the menus of contracts an informed firm is permitted to offer, the firm offers a per-mitted menu to each consumer, and consumers choose contracts from offered menus. If consumer types and firm signals are ordered in a way that reflects coverage need, the regulator can leverage the firm's information by f...
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作者：Buchmann, Nina; Field, Erica; Glennerster, Rachel; Nazneen, Shahana; Wang, Xiao Yu
作者单位：Stanford University; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：Child marriage remains common even where female schooling and employment opportunities have grown. We experimentally evaluate a financial incentive to delay marriage alongside a girls' empowerment program in Bangladesh. While girls eligible for two years of incen-tive are 19 percent less likely to marry underage, the empowerment program failed to decrease adolescent marriage. We show that these results are consistent with a signaling model in which bride type is imperfectly observed but prefer...
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作者：Lashkaripour, Ahmad; Lugovskyy, Volodymyr
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：This paper examines the efficacy of second-best trade restrictions at correcting sectoral misallocation due to scale economies or prof-it-generating markups. To this end, we characterize optimal trade and industrial policies in an important class of quantitative trade models with scale effects and profits, estimating the structural parameters that govern policy outcomes. Our estimates reveal that standalone trade policy measures are remarkably ineffective at correcting mis-allocation, even whe...
