Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Delacretaz, David; Kominers, Scott Duke; Teytelboym, Alexander
• 署名单位: University of Manchester; Harvard University; Harvard University; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210096
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2689-2717
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; MARKET; STABILITY; preferences; Capacities; assignment; priorities; exchange; lattice

摘要

Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the prefer-ences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We intro-duce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of refugee families and the capacities of communities. We propose four refugee resettlement mechanisms and two solution concepts that can be used in refugee resettlement matching under various institutional and informational constraints. Our theoretical results and simula-tions using refugee resettlement data suggest that preference-based matching mechanisms can improve match efficiency, respect prior-ities of communities, and incentivize refugees to report where they would prefer to settle. (JEL C78, D82, J15, J18)