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作者：Fenizia, Alessandra
作者单位：George Washington University
摘要：This paper studies the impacts of managers in the administrative public sector using novel Italian administrative data containing an output-based measure of productivity. Exploiting the rotation of managers across sites, I find that a one standard deviation increase in managerial talent raises office productivity by 10%. These gains are driven primarily by the exit of older workers who retire when more productive managers take over. I use these estimates to evaluate the optimal allocation of m...
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作者：Bonhomme, Stephane; Lamadon, Thibaut; Manresa, Elena
作者单位：University of Chicago; New York University
摘要：We study discrete panel data methods where unobserved heterogeneity is revealed in a first step, in environments where population heterogeneity is not discrete. We focus on two-step grouped fixed-effects (GFE) estimators, where individuals are first classified into groups using kmeans clustering, and the model is then estimated allowing for group-specific heterogeneity. Our framework relies on two key properties: heterogeneity is a function-possibly nonlinear and time-varying-of a low-dimensio...
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作者：Egger, Dennis; Haushofer, Johannes; Miguel, Edward; Niehaus, Paul; Walker, Michael
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stockholm University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：How large economic stimuli generate individual and aggregate responses is a central question in economics, but has not been studied experimentally. We provided one-time cash transfers of about USD 1000 to over 10,500 poor households across 653 randomized villages in rural Kenya. The implied fiscal shock was over 15 percent of local GDP. We find large impacts on consumption and assets for recipients. Importantly, we document large positive spillovers on non-recipient households and firms, and m...
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作者：Denti, Tommaso; Pomatto, Luciano
作者单位：Cornell University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：Smooth ambiguity preferences (Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005)) describe a decision maker who evaluates each act f according to the twofold expectation V(f)=integral P phi(integral omega u(f)dp)d mu(p) defined by a utility function u, an ambiguity index phi, and a belief mu over a set P of probabilities. We provide an axiomatic foundation for the representation, taking as a primitive a preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts. We study a special case where P is a subjective statistical mod...
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作者：Morelli, Juan M.; Ottonello, Pablo; Perez, Diego J.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University
摘要：We study the role of global financial intermediaries in international lending. We construct a model of the world economy, in which heterogeneous borrowers issue risky securities purchased by financial intermediaries. Aggregate shocks transmit internationally through financial intermediaries' net worth. The strength of this transmission is governed by the degree of frictions intermediaries face in financing their risky investments. We provide direct empirical evidence on this mechanism showing ...
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作者：Giuliano, Laura
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
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作者：La'O, Jennifer; Tahbaz-Salehi, Alireza
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University; Northeastern University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies the optimal conduct of monetary policy in a multisector economy in which firms buy and sell intermediate goods over a production network. We first provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the monetary policy's ability to implement flexible-price equilibria in the presence of nominal rigidities and show that, generically, no monetary policy can implement the first-best allocation. We then characterize the optimal policy in terms of the economy's production network and...
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作者：Ales, Laurence; Sleet, Christopher
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Rochester
摘要：Discrete location, occupation, skill, and hours choices of workers underpin their incomes. This paper analyzes the optimal taxation of discrete income-generating choice. It derives optimal tax equations and Pareto test inequalities for mixed logit choice environments that can accommodate discrete and unstructured choice sets, rich preference heterogeneity, and complex aggregate cross-substitution patterns between choices. These equations explicitly connect optimal taxes to societal redistribut...
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作者：Frechette, Guillaume R.; Lizzeri, Alessandro; Perego, Jacopo
作者单位：New York University; Princeton University; Columbia University
摘要：We study the role of commitment in communication and its interactions with rules, which determine whether information is verifiable. Our framework nests models of cheap talk, information disclosure, and Bayesian persuasion. It predicts that commitment has opposite effects on information transmission under the two alternative rules. We leverage these contrasting forces to experimentally establish that subjects react to commitment in line with the main qualitative implications of the theory. Qua...
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作者：Doval, Laura; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London
摘要：We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which the designer can only commit to short-term mechanisms. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the outcomes of any equilibrium in a mechanism-selection game between an uninformed designer and a privately informed agent. A cornerstone of our methodology is the idea that a mechanism should encode not only the rules that determine the allocation, but also the information ...
