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作者：McClellan, Andrew
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：We study the design of approval rules when costly experimentation must be delegated to an agent with misaligned preferences. When the agent has the option to end experimentation, we show that in contrast to standard stopping problems, the optimal approval rule must be history-dependent. We characterize the optimal rule and show the approval threshold moves downward over the course of experimentation. We find that private information may qualitatively change the optimal mechanism: an agent can ...
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作者：Perez-Richet, Eduardo; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We study the optimal design of tests with manipulable inputs. Tests take a unidimensional state of the world as input and output, an informative signal to guide a receiver's approve or reject decision. The receiver wishes to only approve states that comply with her baseline standard. An agent with a preference for approval can covertly falsify the state of the world at a cost. We characterize receiver-optimal tests and show they rely on productive falsification by compliant states. They work b...
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作者：Carlana, Michela; La Ferrara, Eliana; Pinotti, Paolo
作者单位：Harvard University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We study the educational choices of children of immigrants in a tracked school system. We first show that immigrants in Italy enroll disproportionately into vocational high schools, as opposed to technical and academically-oriented ones, compared to natives of similar ability. The gap is greater for male students and it mirrors an analogous differential in grade retention. We then estimate the impact of a large-scale, randomized intervention providing tutoring and career counseling to high-abi...
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作者：Bloise, Gaetano; Siconolfi, Paolo
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; Columbia University
摘要：In this paper, we argue that a large class of recursive contracts can be studied by means of the conventional Negishi method. A planner is responsible for prescribing current actions along with a distribution of future utility values to all agents, so as to maximize their weighted sum of utilities. Under convexity, the method yields the exact efficient frontier. Otherwise, the implementation requires contracts be contingent on publicly observable random signals uncorrelated to fundamentals. We...
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作者：Gouin-Bonenfant, Emilien
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：I study the effect of labor market imperfections on the labor share in a tractable model that emphasizes the interaction between productivity dispersion and firm competition for workers. I calibrate the model using administrative data covering the universe of firms in Canada from 2000 to 2015. As in the data, most firms have a high labor share, yet the aggregate labor share is low due to the disproportionate effect of a small fraction of large, highly productive firms. I find that a rise in th...
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作者：Card, David; DellaVigna, Stefano; Funk, Patricia; Iriberri, Nagore
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Universita della Svizzera Italiana; University of Basque Country; Basque Foundation for Science
摘要：We study the selection of Fellows of the Econometric Society, using a new data set of publications and citations for over 40,000 actively publishing economists since the early 1900s. Conditional on achievement, we document a large negative gap in the probability that women were selected as Fellows in the 1933-1979 period. This gap became positive (though not statistically significant) from 1980 to 2010, and in the past decade has become large and highly significant, with over a 100% increase i...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Chassang, Sylvain; Kawai, Kei; Nakabayashi, Jun; Ortner, Juan
作者单位：Princeton University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Kindai University (Kinki University); Boston University
摘要：We document a novel bidding pattern observed in procurement auctions from Japan: winning bids tend to be isolated, and there is a missing mass of close losing bids. This pattern is suspicious in the following sense: its extreme forms are inconsistent with competitive behavior under arbitrary information structures. Building on this observation, we develop systematic tests of competitive behavior in procurement auctions that allow for general information structures as well as nonstationary unob...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Makhdoumi, Ali; Malekian, Azarakhsh; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Duke University; University of Toronto; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper develops a model of Bayesian learning from online reviews and investigates the conditions for learning the quality of a product and the speed of learning under different rating systems. A rating system provides information about reviews left by previous customers. observe the ratings of a product and decide whether to purchase and review it. We study learning dynamics under two classes of rating systems: full history, where customers see the full history of reviews, and summary stat...
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作者：Sviatschi, Maria Micaela
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：This paper provides evidence that exposure to illegal labor markets during childhood leads to the formation of industry-specific human capital at an early age, putting children on a criminal life path. Using the timing of U.S. antidrug policies, I show that when the return to illegal activities increases in coca suitable areas in Peru, parents increase the use of child labor for coca farming, putting children on a criminal life path. Using administrative records, I show that affected children ...
