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作者：Imbens, Guido W.; Bandiera, Oriana; Donaldson, Dave; Ho, Kate; Jones, Charles, I; Lipman, Barton L.; Lizzeri, Alessandro; Wolinsky, Asher
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作者：Walton, Daniel; Carroll, Gabriel
作者单位：Uber Technologies, Inc.; University of Toronto
摘要：We study a class of models of moral hazard in which a principal contracts with a counterparty, which may have its own internal organizational structure. The principal has non-Bayesian uncertainty as to what actions might be taken in response to the contract, and wishes to maximize her worst-case payoff. We identify conditions on the counterparty's possible responses to any given contract that imply that a linear contract solves this maxmin problem. In conjunction with a Richness property motiv...
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作者：Hansen, Bruce E.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This paper presents finite-sample efficiency bounds for the core econometric problem of estimation of linear regression coefficients. We show that the classical Gauss-Markov theorem can be restated omitting the unnatural restriction to linear estimators, without adding any extra conditions. Our results are lower bounds on the variances of unbiased estimators. These lower bounds correspond to the variances of the the least squares estimator and the generalized least squares estimator, depending...
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作者：Noor, Jawwad; Takeoka, Norio
作者单位：Boston University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：The agent is modeled as a current self that optimally incurs a cognitive cost of empathizing with future selves. The model unifies well-known experimental and empirical findings in intertemporal choice and enriches the multiple selves model with a notion of self-control. The defining feature of the model is magnitude-decreasing impatience: greater patience toward larger rewards. Two behavioral definitions of magnitude-decreasing impatience are provided and the model is characterized under each...
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作者：Bianchi, Javier; Bigio, Saki
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a tractable model of banks' liquidity management with an over-the-counter interbank market to study the credit channel of monetary policy. Deposits circulate randomly across banks and must be settled with reserves. We show how monetary policy affects the banking system by altering the trade-off between profiting from lending and incurring greater liquidity risk. We present two applications of the theory, one involving the connection between the implementation of monetary policy and ...
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作者：Callander, Steven; Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The operation of markets and of politics are in practice deeply intertwined. Political decisions set the rules of the game for market competition and, conversely, market competitors participate in and influence political decisions. We develop an integrated model to capture the circularity between the two domains. We show that a positive feedback loop emerges such that market power begets political power, and political power begets market power, but that this feedback loop is bounded. With too ...
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作者：Faberman, R. Jason; Mueller, Andreas, I; Sahin, Aysegul; Topa, Giorgio
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：We develop a unique survey that focuses on the job search behavior of individuals regardless of their labor force status and field it annually starting in 2013. We use our survey to study the relationship between search effort and outcomes for the employed and non-employed. Three important facts stand out: (1) on-the-job search is pervasive, and is more intense at the lower rungs of the job ladder; (2) the employed are at least three times more effective than the unemployed in job search; and ...
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作者：DellaVigna, Stefano; Linos, Elizabeth
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Nudge interventions have quickly expanded from academic studies to larger implementation in so-called Nudge Units in governments. This provides an opportunity to compare interventions in research studies, versus at scale. We assemble a unique data set of 126 RCTs covering 23 million individuals, including all trials run by two of the largest Nudge Units in the United States. We compare these trials to a sample of nudge trials in academic journals from two recent meta-analyses. In the Academic ...
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作者：Chandrasekher, Madhav; Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; Le Yaouanq, Yves
作者单位：Yale University; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; University of Munich
摘要：We propose a class of multiple-prior representations of preferences under ambiguity, where the belief the decision-maker (DM) uses to evaluate an uncertain prospect is the outcome of a game played by two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism. The model does not restrict the sign of the DM's ambiguity attitude, and we show that it provides a unified framework through which to characterize different degrees of ambiguity aversion, and to represent the co-existence of negative and positive am...
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作者：Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Angrist, Joshua D.; Narita, Yusuke; Pathak, Parag
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yale University
摘要：Many schools in large urban districts have more applicants than seats. Centralized school assignment algorithms ration seats at over-subscribed schools using randomly assigned lottery numbers, non-lottery tie-breakers like test scores, or both. The New York City public high school match illustrates the latter, using test scores and other criteria to rank applicants at the city's screened schools, combined with lottery tie-breaking at the rest. We show how to identify causal effects of school a...
