-
作者：Anagol, Santosh; Fujiwara, Thomas
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Princeton University; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Exploiting regression discontinuity designs in Brazilian, Indian, and Canadian first-past-the-post elections, we document that second-place candidates are substantially more likely than close third-place candidates to run in, and win, subsequent elections. Since both candidates lost the election and had similar electoral performance, this is the effect of being labeled the runner-up. Selection into candidacy is unlikely to explain the effect on winning subsequent elections, and we find no effe...
-
作者：Bocola, Luigi
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper examines the macroeconomic implications of sovereign risk in a model in which banks hold domestic government debt. News of a future sovereign default hampers financial intermediation. First, it tightens the funding constraints of banks, reducing their resources to finance firms (liquidity channel). Second, it generates a precautionary motive to deleverage (risk channel). I estimate the model using Italian data, finding that sovereign risk was recessionary and that the risk channel w...
-
作者：Board, Simon; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Stanford University
摘要：A seller wishes to sell multiple goods by a deadline, for example, the end of a season. Potential buyers enter over time and can strategically time their purchases. Each period, the profit-maximizing mechanism awards units to the buyers with the highest valuations exceeding a sequence of cutoffs. We show that these cutoffs are deterministic, depending only on the inventory and time remaining; in the continuous-time limit, the optimal mechanism can be implemented by posting anonymous prices. Wh...
-
作者：Dziuda, Wioletta; Loeper, Antoine
作者单位：University of Chicago; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We analyze a bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo. The endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players' conflict of interest: Players disagree more often than under exogenous status quo. This leads to inefficiencies and status quo inertia. Under certain conditions, the negotiations can come to a complete gridlock: Players never reach an agreement. Gridlock can occur between players with arbitrarily similar prefe...
-
作者：Bhaskar, V.; Hopkins, Ed
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Edinburgh
摘要：We study the efficiency of premarital investments when parents care about their child's marriage prospects, in a large frictionless marriage market with nontransferable utility. Stochastic returns to investment ensure that equilibrium is unique. We find that, generically, investments exceed the Pareto-efficient level, unless the sexes are symmetric in all respects. Girls will invest more than boys if their quality shocks are less variable than shocks for boys or if they are the abundant sex. T...
-
作者：Burnside, Craig; Eichenbaum, Martin; Rebelo, Sergio
作者单位：Duke University; University of Glasgow; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Some booms in housing prices are followed by busts. Others are not. It is generally difficult to find observable fundamentals that are useful for predicting whether a boom will turn into a bust or not. We develop a model consistent with these observations. Agents have heterogeneous expectations about long-run fundamentals but change their views because of social dynamics. Agents with tighter priors are more likely to convert others to their beliefs. Boom-bust episodes typically occur when skep...
-
作者：Gowrisankaran, Gautam; Reynolds, Stanley S.; Samano, Mario
作者单位：University of Arizona; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：A key problem with solar energy is intermittency: solar generators produce only when the sun is shining, adding to social costs and requiring electricity system operators to reoptimize key decisions. We develop a method to quantify the economic value of large-scale renewable energy. We estimate the model for southeastern Arizona. Not accounting for offset carbon dioxide, we find social costs of $138.40 per megawatt hour for 20 percent solar generation, of which unforecastable intermittency acc...
