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作者：Johnston, Andrew C.; Mas, Alexandre
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Merced; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We examine how a 16-week cut in potential unemployment insurance (UI) duration in Missouri affected search behavior of UI recipients and the aggregate labor market. Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD), we estimate marginal effects of maximum duration on UI and nonemployment spells of 0.45 and 0.25, respectively. We simulate the unemployment rate implied by the RDD estimates assuming no market-level externalities. The implied response closely approximates the decline in the unemployme...
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作者：Board, Simon; Lu, Jay
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Buyers often search across sellers to learn which product best fits their needs. We study how sellers manage these search incentives through their disclosure strategies (e.g., product trials, reviews, and recommendations) and ask how competition affects information provision. If sellers can observe the beliefs of buyers or can coordinate their strategies, then there is an equilibrium in which sellers provide the monopoly level of information. In contrast, if buyers' beliefs are private, then t...
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作者：Einav, Liran; Farronato, Chiara; Levin, Jonathan; Sundaresan, Neel
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Microsoft
摘要：Auctions were very popular in the early days of internet commerce, but today online sellers mostly use posted prices. We model the choice between auctions and posted prices as a trade-off between competitive price discovery and convenience. Evidence from eBay fits the theory. We then show that the decline in auctions was not driven by compositional shifts in seller experience or items sold, but by changing seller incentives. We estimate the demand facing sellers and document falling sale proba...
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作者：Ortner, Juan; Chassang, Sylvain
作者单位：Boston University; New York University
摘要：We model criminal investigation as a principal-agent-monitor problem in which the agent can bribe the monitor to destroy evidence. Building on insights from Laffont and Martimort's 1997 paper, we study whether the principal can profitably introduce asymmetric information between agent and monitor by randomizing the monitor's incentives. We show that it can be the case, but the optimality of random incentives depends on unobserved preexisting patterns of private information. We provide a data-d...
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作者：Fisman, Raymond; Shi, Jing; Wang, Yongxiang; Xu, Rong
作者单位：Boston University; Jiangxi University of Finance & Economics; Macquarie University; University of Southern California; Renmin University of China
摘要：We study favoritism via hometown ties, a common source of favor exchange in China, in fellow selection of the Chinese Academies of Sciences and Engineering. Hometown ties to fellow selection committee members increase candidates' election probability by 39 percent, coming entirely from the selection stage involving an in-person meeting. Elected hometown-connected candidates are half as likely to have a high-impact publication as elected fellows without connections. CAS/CAE membership increases...
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作者：Amiti, Mary; Weinstein, David E.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We show that supply-side financial shocks have a large impact on firms' investment. We develop a new methodology to separate firm borrowing shocks from bank supply shocks using a vast sample of matched bank-firm lending data. We decompose aggregate loan movements in Japan for the period 1990-2010 into bank, firm, industry, and common shocks. The high degree of financial institution concentration means that individual banks are large relative to the size of the economy, which creates a role for...
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作者：Azrieli, Yaron; Chambers, Christopher P.; Healy, Paul J.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Georgetown University
摘要：Experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question. Assuming statewise monotonicity and nothing else, we prove that paying for one randomly chosen problem-the random problem selection mechanism-is essentially the only incentive compatible mechanism. Paying for every period is similarly justified when we assume only a no complementarities at the top condition. To help expe...
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作者：Goodman-Bacon, Andrew
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：This paper provides new evidence that Medicaid's introduction reduced infant and child mortality in the 1960s and 1970s. Mandated coverage of all cash welfare recipients induced substantial cross-state variation in the share of children immediately eligible for the program. Before Medicaid, higher- and lower-eligibility states had similar infant and child mortality trends. After Medicaid, public insurance utilization increased and mortality fell more rapidly among children and infants in high-...
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作者：DellaVigna, Stefano; Pope, Devin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：We analyze how academic experts and nonexperts forecast the results of 15 piece-rate and behavioral treatments in a real-effort task. The average forecast of experts closely predicts the experimental results, with a strong wisdom-of-crowds effect: the average forecast outperforms 96 percent of individual forecasts. Citations, academic rank, field, and contextual experience do not correlate with accuracy. Experts as a group do better than nonexperts, but not if accuracy is defined as rank-order...
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作者：Heath, Rachel
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：I argue that firms use referrals from current workers to mitigate a moral hazard problem. I develop a model in which referrals relax a limited liability constraint by allowing the firm to punish the referral provider if the recipient has low output. I test the model's predictions using household survey data that I collected in Bangladesh. I can control for correlated wage shocks within a network and correlated unobserved type between the recipient and provider I reject the testable implication...
