Why Do Firms Hire Using Referrals? Evidence from Bangladeshi Garment Factories

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heath, Rachel
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/697903
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1691-1746
• 关键词: labor-market outcomes; OLD BOY NETWORKS; social networks; wage inequality; personnel data; strong ties; job search; incentives; EMPLOYMENT; Nepotism

摘要

I argue that firms use referrals from current workers to mitigate a moral hazard problem. I develop a model in which referrals relax a limited liability constraint by allowing the firm to punish the referral provider if the recipient has low output. I test the model's predictions using household survey data that I collected in Bangladesh. I can control for correlated wage shocks within a network and correlated unobserved type between the recipient and provider I reject the testable implications of models in which referrals help firms select unobservably good workers or are solely a nonwage benefit to providers.