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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：It is conventional wisdom that transparency in cartels-monitoring of competitors' prices, sales, and profits-facilitates collusion. However, in several recent cases cartels have instead worked to preserve the privacy of their participants' actions and outcomes. Toward explaining this behavior, we show that cartels can sometimes sustain higher profits when actions and outcomes are observed only privately, because better information can hinder collusion by helping firms devise more profitable de...
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作者：Ramey, Valerie A.; Zubairy, Sarah
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We investigate whether US government spending multipliers are higher during periods of economic slack or when interest rates are near the zero lower bound. Using new quarterly historical US data covering multiple large wars and deep recessions, we estimate multipliers that are below unity irrespective of the amount of slack in the economy. These results are robust to two leading identification schemes, two different estimation methodologies, and many alternative specifications. In contrast, th...
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作者：Walters, Christopher R.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper models decisions to apply to and attend charter schools in Boston using a generalized Roy selection framework linking preferences to the achievement gains generated by charter attendance. The model is estimated with instruments based on randomized admission lotteries and distance to charter schools. Charter schools generate larger gains for disadvantaged students, but demand for charters is stronger among more advantaged students. Similarly, gains are inversely related to unobserved...
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作者：Haselmann, Rainer; Schoenherr, David; Vig, Vikrant
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; Princeton University; University of London; London Business School; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We employ a unique data set on members of an elite service club in Germany to investigate how social connections in elite networks affect the allocation of resources. Specifically, we investigate credit allocation decisions of banks to firms inside the network. Using a quasi-experimental research design, we document misallocation of bank credit inside the network, with bankers with weakly aligned incentives engaging most actively in crony lending. Our findings, thus, resonate with existing the...
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作者：Prat, Andrea
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：This paper defines the power of a media organization as its ability to induce voters to make electoral decisions they would not make if reporting were unbiased. It derives a robust upper bound to media power over a range of assumptions about the beliefs and attention patterns of voters. The paper then presents estimates of the power index for the United States and shows how these can inform merger analysis and other policy debates.
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作者：Becker, Gary S.; Kominers, Scott Duke; Murphy, Kevin M.; Spenkuch, Jorg L.
作者单位：University of Chicago; Harvard University; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the link between market forces, cross-sectional inequality, and intergenerational mobility. Emphasizing complementarities in the production of human capital, we show that wealthy parents invest, on average, more in their offspring than poorer ones. As a result, economic status persists across generations even in a world with perfect capital markets and without differences in innate ability. In fact, under certain conditions, successive generations of the same family may cease to regre...
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作者：Jackson, C. Kirabo
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Teachers affect a variety of student outcomes through their influence on both cognitive and noncognitive skill. I proxy for students' noncognitive skill using non-test score behaviors. These behaviors include absences, suspensions, course grades, and grade repetition in ninth grade. Teacher effects on test scores and those on behaviors are weakly correlated. Teacher effects on behaviors predict larger impacts on high school completion and other longer-run outcomes than their effects on test sc...
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作者：Bianchi, Javier; Mendoza, Enrique G.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Collateral constraints widely used in models of financial crises feature a pecuniary externality: Agents do not internalize how borrowing decisions made in good times affect collateral prices during a crisis. We show that under commitment the optimal financial regulator's plans are time inconsistent and study time-consistent policy. Quantitatively, this policy reduces sharply the frequency and magnitude of crises, removes fat tails from the distribution of asset returns, and increases social w...
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作者：Ilut, Cosmin; Kehrig, Matthias; Schneider, Martin
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Stanford University
摘要：Concave hiring rules imply that firms respond more to bad shocks than to good shocks. They provide a unified explanation for several seemingly unrelated facts about employment growth in macro- and microdata. In particular, they generate countercyclical movement in both aggregate conditional macro volatility and cross-sectional micro volatility, as well as negative skewness in the cross section and in the time series at different levels of aggregation. Concave establishment-level responses of e...
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作者：Roessler, Christian; Shelegia, Sandro; Strulovici, Bruno
作者单位：California State University System; California State University East Bay; Pompeu Fabra University; Northwestern University
摘要：We consider collective decisions made by agents whose preferences and power depend on past events and decisions. Faced with an inefficient equilibrium and an opportunity to commit to a policy, can the agents reach an agreement on such a policy? We provide a consistency condition linking power structures in the dynamic setting and at the commitment stage. When the condition holds, commitment has no value: any agreement that may be reached at the outset coincides with the equilibrium without com...
