Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Azrieli, Yaron; Chambers, Christopher P.; Healy, Paul J.
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/698136
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1472-1503
• 关键词: Preference reversal; individualistic ethics; expected utility; cardinal welfare; risk-aversion; house money; DECISION; INDEPENDENCE; CHOICE; ambiguity

摘要

Experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question. Assuming statewise monotonicity and nothing else, we prove that paying for one randomly chosen problem-the random problem selection mechanism-is essentially the only incentive compatible mechanism. Paying for every period is similarly justified when we assume only a no complementarities at the top condition. To help experimenters decide which is appropriate for their particular experiment, we discuss empirical tests of these two assumptions.