Competitive Information Disclosure in Search Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Board, Simon; Lu, Jay
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/699211
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1965-2010
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion; multiple senders; ECONOMICS

摘要

Buyers often search across sellers to learn which product best fits their needs. We study how sellers manage these search incentives through their disclosure strategies (e.g., product trials, reviews, and recommendations) and ask how competition affects information provision. If sellers can observe the beliefs of buyers or can coordinate their strategies, then there is an equilibrium in which sellers provide the monopoly level of information. In contrast, if buyers' beliefs are private, then there is an equilibrium in which sellers provide full information as search costs vanish. Anonymity and coordination thus play important roles in understanding how advice markets work.