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作者：Garleanu, Nicolae; Panageas, Stavros
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In an overlapping-generations economy, the consumption growth of a given cohort member (the marginal agent) differs from the aggregate consumption growth. A cohort member is faced with long-run consumption uncertainty even in the absence of aggregate (and within-cohort) consumption risk. This uncertainty allows the model to account for several stylized asset-pricing facts (high market price of risk and volatility, return predictability, low and nonvolatile interest rate) despite deterministic ...
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作者：Khanna, Gaurav
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：The economic consequences of large-scale government investments in education depend on general equilibrium effects in both the labor market and the education sector. I develop a general equilibrium model capturing the consequences of massive countrywide schooling initiatives. I provide unbiased estimates of the model's elasticities, using a regression discontinuity derived from Indian government policy. The earnings returns to a year of education are 13.4%, and the general equilibrium labor ma...
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作者：McGuirk, Eoin F.; Hilger, Nathaniel; Miller, Nicholas
作者单位：Tufts University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Chan Zuckerberg Initiative (CZI); Dartmouth College
摘要：We study agency frictions in the US Congress. We examine the long-standing hypothesis that political elites engage in conflict because they fail to internalize the associated costs. We compare the voting behavior of legislators with draft age sons versus draft age daughters during the conscription-era wars of the twentieth century. We estimate that having a draft age son reduces proconscription voting by 7-11 percentage points. Support for conscription recovers when a legislator's son ages out...
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作者：Greulich, Katharina; Laczo, Sarolta; Marcet, Albert
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; ICREA
摘要：We study optimal Pareto-improving factor taxation when agents are heterogeneous in their labor productivity and wealth and markets are complete. Pareto-improving policies require a gradual reform: labor taxes should be cut, and capital taxes should remain high for a long time before reaching the limit. This policy redistributes wealth in favor of workers, promotes growth, and causes early deficits and government debt in the long run. We address several technical issues, such as sufficiency of ...
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作者：Friebel, Guido; Heinz, Matthias; Hoffman, Mitchell; Zubanov, Nick
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Toronto; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Konstanz
摘要：Employee referral programs (ERPs) are randomly introduced in a grocery chain. On direct effects, larger referral bonuses increase referral quantity but decrease quality, though the increase in referrals from ERPs is modest. However, the overall effect of having an ERP is substantial, reducing attrition by 15% and significantly decreasing labor costs. This occurs, partly, because referrals stay longer than nonreferrals, but, mainly, from indirect effects: nonreferrals stay longer in treated tha...
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作者：Koessler, Frederic; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study informed persuasion, whereby a privately informed designer without ex ante commitment power chooses disclosure mechanisms to influence agents' actions. We characterize the subset of Bayes-correlated equilibria yielding every designer type a payoff higher than what they could get from any disclosure mechanism with credible beliefs. This set of interim-optimal mechanisms is nonempty and tractable, and all its elements are perfect Bayesian equilibrium mechanisms of the informed-designer ...
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作者：Kattwinkel, Deniz; Knoepfle, Jan
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：A principal has to take a binary decision. She relies on information privately held by an agent who prefers the same action regardless of his type. The principal cannot incentivize with transfers but can learn the agent's type at a cost. Additionally, the principal privately observes a signal correlated with the agent's type. Transparent mechanisms are optimal: the principal's payoff is the same as if her signal was public. A simple cutoff form is optimal: favorable signals ensure the agent's ...
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作者：Lewbel, Arthur; Qu, Xi; Tang, Xun
摘要：We point-identify and estimate linear social network models without observing any network links. The required data consist of many small networks of individuals, such as classrooms or villages, with individuals who are each observed only once. We apply our estimator to data from Tennessee's Project STAR (Student-Teacher Achievement Ratio). Without observing the latent network in each classroom, we identify and estimate peer and contextual effects on students' performance in mathematics. We fin...
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作者：Filiz-Ozbay, Emel; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We introduce a flexible framework to study probabilistic choice that accommodates heterogeneous types and bounded rationality. We provide a novel progressive structure for the heterogeneous types to capture heterogeneity due to varying levels of a behavioral trait. Given an order of alternatives, our progressive structure sorts the types by the extent to which they align with this order. Unlike the random-utility model, our model uniquely identifies the heterogeneity, allowing policy makers to...
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作者：Baldwin, Elizabeth; Jagadeesan, Ravi; Klemperer, Paul; Teytelboym, Alexander
作者单位：University of Oxford; Stanford University
摘要：We show that with indivisible goods, the existence of competitive equilibrium fundamentally depends on agents' substitution effects, not their income effects. Our equilibrium existence duality allows us to transport results on the existence of competitive equilibrium from settings with transferable utility to settings with income effects. One consequence is that net substitutability-which is a strictly weaker condition than gross substitutability-is sufficient for the existence of competitive ...
