Costless Information and Costly Verification: A Case for Transparency

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Kattwinkel, Deniz; Knoepfle, Jan
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London; University of London; Queen Mary University London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/721618
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Informed principal; Correlated information; private information; Optimal allocation; optimal-contracts; mechanism design; auctions; rules; implementation; disclosure

摘要

A principal has to take a binary decision. She relies on information privately held by an agent who prefers the same action regardless of his type. The principal cannot incentivize with transfers but can learn the agent's type at a cost. Additionally, the principal privately observes a signal correlated with the agent's type. Transparent mechanisms are optimal: the principal's payoff is the same as if her signal was public. A simple cutoff form is optimal: favorable signals ensure the agent's preferred action. Signals below this cutoff lead to the nonpreferred action unless the agent appeals. An appeal always triggers type verification.