What Do Employee Referral Programs Do? Measuring the Direct and Overall Effects of a Management Practice

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Friebel, Guido; Heinz, Matthias; Hoffman, Mitchell; Zubanov, Nick
• 署名单位: Goethe University Frankfurt; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Toronto; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Konstanz
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/721735
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: human-resource management; social networks; performance; incentives; FIRMS; work; US; randomization; PRODUCTIVITY; PREJUDICE

摘要

Employee referral programs (ERPs) are randomly introduced in a grocery chain. On direct effects, larger referral bonuses increase referral quantity but decrease quality, though the increase in referrals from ERPs is modest. However, the overall effect of having an ERP is substantial, reducing attrition by 15% and significantly decreasing labor costs. This occurs, partly, because referrals stay longer than nonreferrals, but, mainly, from indirect effects: nonreferrals stay longer in treated than in control stores. The most supported mechanism for these indirect effects is workers value being involved in hiring. Attrition impacts are larger in higher performing stores and better local labor markets.