-
作者：Garcia, Jorge Luis; Heckman, James J.; Ronda, Victor
作者单位：Clemson University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; University of Southern California
摘要：This paper demonstrates the long-term intra- and intergenerational benefits of the HighScope Perry Preschool Project, which targeted disadvantaged African American children. We use newly collected data on the original participants through late middle age and on their children into their midtwenties. We document long-lasting improvements in the original participants' skills, marriage stability, earnings, criminal behavior, and health. Beneficial program impacts through the child-rearing years t...
-
作者：Isoni, Andrea; Sugden, Robert; Zheng, Jiwei
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of Cagliari; University of East Anglia; Lancaster University
摘要：Most social preference theories are based on observations of nonvoluntary interactions. Nonselfish behavior may take fundamentally different forms in voluntary interactions, such as market transactions. We investigate the Principle of Mutual Benefit-an injunctive norm requiring individuals who enter interactions voluntarily to conform to common expectations about behavior within them. This norm induces patterns of behavior inconsistent with existing social preference theories and allows extrin...
-
作者：Arellano, Cristina; Mateos-Planas, Xavier; Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Pennsylvania; University of London; University College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We document that countries partially default often and with varying intensity, resulting in lengthy episodes and hump-shaped patterns for partial default and debt. Default episodes lead to haircuts for lenders but not to reductions in debt, because the defaulted debt accumulates and borrowing continues. We present a theory of partial default rationalizing these patterns and the heterogeneity of partial default, and partial default's comovements with spreads, debt, and output that are absent in...
-
作者：Gleyze, Simon; Pernoud, Agathe
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Stanford University
摘要：We consider a mechanism design setting in which agents can acquire costly information on their preferences as well as others'. A mechanism is informationally simple if agents have no incentive to learn about others' preferences. This property is of interest for two reasons. First, it is a necessary condition for the existence of dominant-strategy equilibria in the extended game. Second, this endogenizes an independent-private-value property of the interim information structure. We show that, g...
-
作者：Au, Pak Hung; Whitmeyer, Mark
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer's visit will glean. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game, the countervailing incentives of attraction and persuasion yield a payoff function for each firm that is linear in the firm's realized effective value. If the expected quality of the products is sufficiently high (or competition is sufficiently...
-
作者：Bianchi, Javier; Ottonello, Pablo; Presno, Ignacio
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：What is the optimal fiscal policy response to a recession when the government is subject to sovereign risk? We study this question in a model of endogenous sovereign default with nominal rigidities. Increasing spending in a recession reduces unemployment, but it exposes the government to a debt crisis. We quantitatively analyze this trade-off between stimulus and austerity and find that expanding government spending may be undesirable, even in the presence of sizable Keynesian stabilization ga...
-
作者：Angeletos, George-Marios; Lian, Chen
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Our understanding of monetary policy is complicated by an indeterminacy problem: the same path for the nominal interest rate is consistent with multiple equilibrium paths for inflation and output. We offer a potential resolution by showing that small frictions in social memory and intertemporal coordination can remove this indeterminacy. Under our perturbations, the unique equilibrium is the same as that selected by the Taylor principle, but it no more relies on it; monetary policy is left to ...
-
作者：Harstad, Bard
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Every government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or conserve it and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a positive theory of this situation and shows when a small change in parameter values has a multiplier effect on exploitation. The multiplier strengthens the influence of a lobby paying for exploitation and of a donor compensating for conservation. A successful donor pays every period for eac...
-
作者：Bouchaud, Jean-Philippe; Farmer, Roger E. A.
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We construct a model of an exchange economy in which agents trade assets contingent on an observable signal, the probability of which depends on public opinion. The agents in our model are replaced occasionally, and each person updates beliefs in response to observed outcomes. We show that the distribution of the observed signal is described by a quasi-nonergodic process and that people continue to disagree with each other forever. These disagreements generate large wealth inequalities that ar...
-
作者：Farboodi, Maryam
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：I study a model of the financial sector in which intermediation among debt-financed banks gives rise to an endogenous core-periphery network. Endogenous intermediation generates excessive systemic risk in the financial network. Financial institutions have incentives to capture intermediation spreads through strategic borrowing and lending decisions. By doing so, they tilt the division of surplus along an intermediation chain in their favor, while at the same time reducing aggregate surplus. Th...
