Informed Information Design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Koessler, Frederic; Skreta, Vasiliki
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/724843
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 3186-3232
• 关键词: principal-agent relationship; Bayesian persuasion; correlated equilibrium; mechanism design; games; THEOREMS

摘要

We study informed persuasion, whereby a privately informed designer without ex ante commitment power chooses disclosure mechanisms to influence agents' actions. We characterize the subset of Bayes-correlated equilibria yielding every designer type a payoff higher than what they could get from any disclosure mechanism with credible beliefs. This set of interim-optimal mechanisms is nonempty and tractable, and all its elements are perfect Bayesian equilibrium mechanisms of the informed-designer game. Interim-optimal mechanisms are characterized via belief-based approaches in pure persuasion settings. We identify single- and multiagent interactive environments in which ex ante-optimal mechanisms are interim optimal.