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作者：Maskin, E.; Saari, D. G.
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作者：Eliason, Paul; League, Riley; Leder-Luis, Jetson; Mcdevitt, Ryan C.; Roberts, James W.
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Boston University; Duke University
摘要：We study the effectiveness of pay-and-chase lawsuits and up-front regulations for combating health-care fraud. Between 2003 and 2017, Medicare spent $7.7 billion on 37.5 million regularly scheduled ambulance rides for patients traveling to and from dialysis facilities even though many did not satisfy Medicare's criteria for receiving reimbursements. Using an identification strategy based on the staggered timing of regulations and lawsuits across the United States, we find that adding a prior a...
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作者：Halac, Marina; Yared, Pierre
作者单位：Yale University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We propose a political economy mechanism that explains the presence of fiscal regimes punctuated by crisis periods. Our model focuses on the interaction between successive deficit-biased governments subject to independently and identically distributed fiscal shocks. We show that the economy transitions between a fiscally responsible regime and a fiscally irresponsible regime, with transitions occurring during crises when fiscal needs are large. Under fiscal responsibility, governments limit th...
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作者：Antic, Nemanja; Chakraborty, Archishman; Harbaugh, Rick
作者单位：Northwestern University; Yeshiva University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Two players with common interests exchange information to make a decision. But they fear scrutiny. Their unencrypted communications will be observed by another agent with different interests who can object to their decision. We show how the players can implement their ideal decision rule using a back-and-forth conversation. Such a subversive conversation reveals enough information for the players to determine their best decision but not enough information for the observer to determine whether ...
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作者：Bartelme, Dominick; Costinot, Arnaud; Donaldson, Dave; Rodriguez-Clare, Andres
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The textbook case for industrial policy is well understood: sectors with relatively large external economies of scale should be subsidized at the expense of other sectors. Little is known, however, about the magnitude of the welfare gains from such interventions. We develop an empirical strategy that leverages commonly available trade data to estimate sector-level economies of scale and, in turn, to quantify the gains from optimal industrial policy in a general equilibrium environment. Our res...
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作者：Elliott, Jonathan T.; Houngbonon, Georges V.; Ivaldi, Marc; Scott, Paul T.
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; New York University
摘要：We develop a model of competition in prices and infrastructure among mobile network operators. Although consolidation increases market power, it can lead to more efficient data transmission due to economies of scale, which we derive from physical principles. After estimating our model with French consumer and infrastructure data, equilibrium simulations reveal that while prices decrease with the number of firms, so do download speeds. Our framework also allows us to quantify the impact of spec...
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作者：Khantadze, Davit; Kremer, Ilan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Warwick; Stanford University
摘要：We consider a Bayesian persuasion model in which multiple receivers take one action each. We compare simultaneous procedures with sequential ones. In a simultaneous procedure, all the receivers act simultaneously following the realization of a single public signal. In a sequential procedure, receivers receive information and take actions sequentially. We characterize the conditions under which the optimal sequential procedure leads to a higher payoff and characterize the optimal ordering of ac...
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作者：Annan, Francis
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Misconduct-market actions that are unethical and indicative of fraud-is a significant yet poorly understood issue that underlies many economic transactions. We design a field experiment to study the impact of two-sided antimisconduct information programs, which we deploy on the local markets for mobile money (human ATMs) in Ghana. The programs lead to a large reduction in misconduct (-21 percentage points=-72%) and, as a result, broader improvements in overall market activity, consumer welfare...
