A Theory of Fiscal Responsibility and Irresponsibility

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Halac, Marina; Yared, Pierre
• 署名单位: Yale University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/734131
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1574-1620
• 关键词: Optimal taxation; repeated games; POLICY; DISCRETION; rules; reputation; collusion; GROWTH; Ramsey

摘要

We propose a political economy mechanism that explains the presence of fiscal regimes punctuated by crisis periods. Our model focuses on the interaction between successive deficit-biased governments subject to independently and identically distributed fiscal shocks. We show that the economy transitions between a fiscally responsible regime and a fiscally irresponsible regime, with transitions occurring during crises when fiscal needs are large. Under fiscal responsibility, governments limit their spending to avoid transitioning to fiscal irresponsibility. Under fiscal irresponsibility, governments spend excessively and precipitate crises that lead to the reinstatement of fiscal responsibility. Regime transitions can occur only if governments' deficit bias is large enough.