Misconduct and Reputation under Imperfect Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Annan, Francis
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/734133
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1460-1496
• 关键词: selection; networks

摘要

Misconduct-market actions that are unethical and indicative of fraud-is a significant yet poorly understood issue that underlies many economic transactions. We design a field experiment to study the impact of two-sided antimisconduct information programs, which we deploy on the local markets for mobile money (human ATMs) in Ghana. The programs lead to a large reduction in misconduct (-21 percentage points=-72%) and, as a result, broader improvements in overall market activity, consumer welfare, and firm revenue. We show the treatment effect is due to a combination of more accurate consumer beliefs about misconduct and increased vendor reputation concerns.