Subversive Conversations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Antic, Nemanja; Chakraborty, Archishman; Harbaugh, Rick
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Yeshiva University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/734130
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1621-1660
• 关键词: eliciting information; authority; COMMUNICATION

摘要

Two players with common interests exchange information to make a decision. But they fear scrutiny. Their unencrypted communications will be observed by another agent with different interests who can object to their decision. We show how the players can implement their ideal decision rule using a back-and-forth conversation. Such a subversive conversation reveals enough information for the players to determine their best decision but not enough information for the observer to determine whether the decision was against his interest. Our results show how conversations can maintain deniability even in the face of leaks, hacks, and other public exposures.