Persuasion with Multiple Actions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Khantadze, Davit; Kremer, Ilan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
署名单位：
Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Warwick; Stanford University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-3808
DOI：
10.1086/734125
发表日期：
2025
页码：
1497-1526
关键词：
摘要：
We consider a Bayesian persuasion model in which multiple receivers take one action each. We compare simultaneous procedures with sequential ones. In a simultaneous procedure, all the receivers act simultaneously following the realization of a single public signal. In a sequential procedure, receivers receive information and take actions sequentially. We characterize the conditions under which the optimal sequential procedure leads to a higher payoff and characterize the optimal ordering of actions.