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作者：Stahl, Konrad; Strausz, Roland
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：In markets with quality unobservable to buyers, third-party certification is often the only instrument to increase transparency. While both sellers and buyers have a demand for certification, its role differs fundamentally: sellers use it for signalling, buyers use it for inspection. Seller-induced certification leads to more transparency, because it is informative-even if unused. By contrast, buyer-induced certification incentivizes certifiers to limit transparency, as this raises demand for ...
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作者：Fort, Teresa C.
作者单位：Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article provides direct empirical evidence on the relationship between technology and firms' global sourcing strategies. Using new data on U.S. firms' decisions to contract for manufacturing services from domestic or foreign suppliers, I show that a firm's adoption of communication technology between 2002 and 2007 is associated with a 3.1 point increase in its probability of fragmentation. The effect of firm technology also differs significantly across industries; in 2007, it is 20% highe...
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作者：Cheremukhin, Anton; Golosov, Mikhail; Guriev, Sergei; Tsyvinski, Aleh
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Dallas; Princeton University; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Yale University
摘要：This article studies the structural transformation of Russia in 1885-1940 from an agrarian to an industrial economy through the lens of a two-sector neoclassical growth model. We construct a data set that covers Tsarist Russia during 1885-1913 and Soviet Union during 1928-1940. We develop a methodology that allows us to identify the types of frictions and economic mechanisms that had the largest quantitative impact on Russian economic development. We find that entry barriers and monopoly power...
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作者：Booij, A. S.; Leuvene; Osterbeek, H.
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作者：Johnson, Justin P.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：I provide an analysis of vertical relations in markets with imperfect competition at both layers of the supply chain and where exchange is intermediated either with wholesale prices or revenue-sharing contracts. Revenue-sharing is extremely attractive to firms that are able to set the revenue shares but often makes the firms that set retail prices worse off. This is so whether revenue-sharing lowers or raises industry profits. These results are strengthened when a market moves from the wholesa...
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作者：Schumacher, Heiner; Kesternich, Iris; Kosfeld, Michael; Winter, Joachim
作者单位：KU Leuven; Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Munich
摘要：We experimentally analyse distributional preferences when a decider chooses the provision of a good that benefits herself or a receiver, and creates costs for a group of payers. The treatment variation is the number of payers. We observe that subjects provide the good even if there are many payers so that the costs of provision exceed the benefits by far. This result holds regardless of whether the provision increases the decider's payoff or not. Intriguingly, it is not only selfish or maximin...
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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; University of Bonn; University of Toronto
摘要：We derive the incentive compatible and ex-ante welfare maximizing (i.e. utilitarian) mechanism for settings with an arbitrary number of agents and alternatives where the privately informed agents have single-crossing and single-peaked preferences. The optimal outcome can be implemented by modifying a sequential voting scheme that is used in many legislatures and committees. The modification uses a flexible majority threshold for each of several alternatives, and allows us to replicate, via a s...
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作者：Egorov, Georgy; Harstad, Bard
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Oslo
摘要：Public regulation is increasingly facing competition from private politics in the form of activism and corporate self-regulation. However, its effectiveness, welfare consequences, and interaction with public regulation are poorly understood. This article presents a unified dynamic framework for studying the interaction between public regulation, self-regulation, and boycotts. We show that the possibility of self-regulation saves on administrative costs, but also leads to delays. Without an act...
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作者：Ifrach, Bar; Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
作者单位：Airbnb; Stanford University
摘要：In this article we introduce a new computationally tractable framework for Ericson and Pakes-style dynamic oligopoly models that overcomes the computational complexity involved in computing Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). First, we define a new equilibrium concept that we call moment-based Markov equilibrium (MME), in which firms keep track of their own state, the detailed state of dominant firms, and few moments of the distribution of fringe firms' states. Second, we provide guidelines to u...
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作者：Gentzkow, Matthew; Kamenica, Emir
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We identify a condition on the information environment (i.e. the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome, regardless of preferences. The same condition also provides an easy way to characterize...
