The Agency Model and MFN Clauses

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Johnson, Justin P.
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdx007
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1151-1185
• 关键词: ad-valorem; pass-through; unit taxes; COMPETITION; CONTRACTS

摘要

I provide an analysis of vertical relations in markets with imperfect competition at both layers of the supply chain and where exchange is intermediated either with wholesale prices or revenue-sharing contracts. Revenue-sharing is extremely attractive to firms that are able to set the revenue shares but often makes the firms that set retail prices worse off. This is so whether revenue-sharing lowers or raises industry profits. These results are strengthened when a market moves from the wholesale model of sales to the agency model of sales, which results in retailers setting revenue shares and suppliers setting retail prices. I also show that retail price-parity restrictions raise industry prices. These results provide a potential explanation for why many online retailers have adopted the agency model and retail price-parity clauses.