Certification and Market Transparency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stahl, Konrad; Strausz, Roland
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; Humboldt University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdw064
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1842-1868
• 关键词: Mechanism design; information acquisition; quality disclosure; Rating agencies; product quality; Verifiability; lemons

摘要

In markets with quality unobservable to buyers, third-party certification is often the only instrument to increase transparency. While both sellers and buyers have a demand for certification, its role differs fundamentally: sellers use it for signalling, buyers use it for inspection. Seller-induced certification leads to more transparency, because it is informative-even if unused. By contrast, buyer-induced certification incentivizes certifiers to limit transparency, as this raises demand for inspection. Whenever transparency is socially beneficial, seller certification is preferable. It also yields certifiers larger profits, so that regulating the mode of certification is redundant.