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作者：Dominitz, Jeff; Manski, Charles F.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University
摘要：When designing data collection, crucial questions arise regarding how much data to collect and how much effort to expend to enhance the quality of the collected data. To make choice of sample design a coherent subject of study, it is desirable to specify an explicit decision problem. We use theWald framework of statistical decision theory to study allocation of a budget between two or more sampling processes. These processes all draw random samples from a population of interest and aim to coll...
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作者：Pavoni, Nicola; Yazici, Hakki
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Sabanci University
摘要：We study optimal taxation of bequests and inter vivos transfers in a model where altruistic parents and their offspring disagree on intertemporal trade-offs. We show that the laissez-faire equilibrium is Pareto inefficient, and whenever offspring are impatient from their parents' perspective, optimal policy involves a positive tax on parental transfers. Cautioned by the technical complications present in this class of models, our normative prescriptions do not rely on the assumption of differe...
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作者：Heidhues, Paul; Koszegi, Botond; Murooka, Takeshi
作者单位：European School of Management & Technology; Central European University; University of Munich
摘要：We analyse conditions facilitating profitable deception in a simple model of a competitive retail market. Firms selling homogenous products set anticipated prices that consumers understand and additional prices that naive consumers ignore unless revealed to them by a firm, where we assume that there is a binding floor on the anticipated prices. Our main results establish that bad products (those with lower social surplus than an alternative) tend to be more reliably profitable than good produc...
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作者：Ozdenoren, Emre; Yuan, Kathy
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study effort and risk-taking behaviour in an economy with a continuum of principal-agent pairs where each agent exerts costly hidden effort. Principals write contracts based on both absolute and relative performance evaluations (APE and RPE, respectively) to make individually optimal risk-return trade-offs but do not take into account their impact on endogenously determined aggregate variables. This results in contractual externalities when these aggregate variables are used as benchmarks i...
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作者：Madarasz, Kristof; Prat, Andrea
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Columbia University
摘要：Principals often operate on misspecified models of their agents' preferences. When preferences are such that non-local incentive constraints may bind in the optimum, even slight misspecification of the preferences can lead to large and non-vanishing losses. Instead, we propose a two-step scheme whereby the principal: (1) identifies the model-optimal menu; and (2) modifies prices by offering to share with the agent a fixed proportion of the profit she would receive if an item were sold at the m...
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作者：Dellavigna, Stefano; Hermle, Johannes
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Media outlets are increasingly owned by conglomerates, inducing a conflict of interest: a media outlet can bias its coverage to benefit companies in the same group. We test for bias by examining movie reviews in media outlets owned by News Corp, such as the Wall Street Journal, and Time Warner, such as Time. We find higher ratings for 20th Century Fox movies in News Corp. outlets compared to movies by other studios. To disentangle bias from correlation of taste, we introduce and validate a nov...
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作者：Grieco, Paul L. E.; Mcdevitt, Ryan C.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Duke University
摘要：We show that healthcare providers face a tradeoff between increasing the number of patients they treat and improving their quality of care. To measure the magnitude of this quality-quantity tradeoff, we estimate a model of dialysis provision that explicitly incorporates a centre's unobservable and endogenous choice of treatment quality while allowing for unobserved differences in productivity across centres. We find that a centre that reduces its quality standards such that its expected rate o...
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作者：Dingel, Jonathan I.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：A growing literature suggests that high-income countries export high-quality goods. Two hypotheses may explain such specialization, with different implications for welfare, inequality, and trade policy. Fajgelbaum et al. formalize the Linder hypothesis that home demand determines the pattern of specialization and, therefore, predict that high-income locations export high-quality products. The factor-proportions model also predicts that skill-abundant, high-income locations export skill-intensi...
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作者：Bonatti, Alessandro; Cisternas, Gonzalo; Toikka, Juuso
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We consider learning and signalling in a dynamic Cournot oligopoly where firms have private information about their production costs and only observe the market price, which is subject to unobservable demand shocks. An equilibrium is Markov if play depends on the history only through the firms' beliefs about costs and calendar time. We characterize symmetric linear Markov equilibria as solutions to a boundary value problem. In every such equilibrium, given a long enough horizon, play converges...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Di Tillio, Alfredo; Faingold, Eduardo; Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Yale University; Yale University; University of Bristol
摘要：Previous research has established that the predictions of game theory are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players' beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by characterizing conditions on the primitives of the model-the players' beliefs and higher-order beliefs about the payoff-relevant parameters-for the behaviour of a given Harsanyi type to be approximated by the behaviour of (a sequence of) perturbed types. This amounts to providing belief-based charact...
