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作者：Harstad, Bard; Mideksa, Torben K.
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：This article provides a flexible model of resource extraction, such as deforestation, and derives the optimal conservation contract. When property rights are strong and districts are in charge of extracting their own resources to get revenues, conservation in one district benefits the others since the reduced supply raises the sales price. A central authority would internalize this positive externality and thus conserve more. When property rights are instead weak and extraction is illegal or c...
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作者：Hoderlein, Stefan; Holzmann, Hajo; Kasy, Maximilian; Meister, Alexander
作者单位：Boston College; Philipps University Marburg; Harvard University; University of Rostock
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作者：Bobtcheff, Catherine; Bolte, Jerome; Mariotti, Thomas
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：We propose and analyse a general model of priority races. Researchers privately have breakthroughs and decide how long to let their ideas mature before disclosing them, thereby establishing priority. Two-researcher, symmetric priority races have a unique equilibrium that can be characterized by a differential equation. We study how the shapes of the breakthrough distribution and of the returns to maturation affect maturation delays and research quality, both in dynamic and comparative statics ...
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作者：Davila, Eduardo; Korinek, Anton
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作者：Faria-e-Castro, Miguel; Martinez, Joseba; Philippon, Thomas
作者单位：New York University; New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises. Providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets, but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs. In our model, governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons. A fiscal backstop mitigates the cost of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy. Our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informa...
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作者：Landier, Augustin; Plantin, Guillaume
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：Affluent households can respond to taxation with means that are not economically viable for the rest of the population, such as sophisticated tax plans and international tax arbitrage. This article studies an economy in which an inequality-averse social planner faces agents who have access to a tax-avoidance technology with subadditive costs, and who can shape the risk profile of their income as they see fit. Subadditive avoidance costs imply that optimal taxation cannot be progressive at the ...
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作者：Martimort, David; Semenov, Aggey; Stole, Lars
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Ottawa; University of Chicago
摘要：We develop a theory of contracts with limited enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship. The seller is privately informed on his persistent cost, while the buyer remains uninformed. Public enforcement relies on remedies for breaches. Private enforcement comes from terminating the relationship. We first characterize enforcement constraints under asymmetric information. Those constraints ensure that parties never breach contracts. In particular, a high-cost seller may be tempted to tr...
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作者：Dellavigna, Stefano; List, John A.; Malmendier, Ulrike; Rao, Gautam
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; Harvard University
摘要：Why do people vote? We design a field experiment to estimate a model of voting because others will ask. The expectation of being asked motivates turnout if individuals derive pride from telling others that they voted, or feel shame from admitting that they did not vote, provided that lying is costly. In a door-to-door survey about election turnout, we experimentally vary (1) the informational content and use of a flyer pre-announcing the survey, (2) the duration and payment for the survey, and...
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作者：Lipscomb, Molly; Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq
作者单位：University of Virginia; Yale University
摘要：Decentralization can improve service delivery, but it can also generate externalities across jurisdictional boundaries. We examine the nature and size of water pollution externalities as rivers flow across jurisdictions. Panel data on water pollution in Brazilian rivers coupled with county splits that change the locations of borders allow us to identify the spatial patterns of pollution as rivers approach and cross borders, controlling for fixed effects and trends specific to each location. Th...
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作者：Caldara, Dario; Kamps, Christophe
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; European Central Bank
摘要：Do tax cuts and spending increases stimulate output? Studies that identify fiscal shocks using structural vector autoregressions (SVAR) have reached different conclusions. In this article, we show analytically that this lack of consensus reflects different assumptions on the fiscal rules that-by relating tax and spending policies to macroeconomic conditions-determine the identification of fiscal shocks and the associated fiscal multipliers. We then propose a new identification strategy based o...
