Optimal Voting Rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; University of Bonn; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdw044
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 688-717
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; schemes

摘要

We derive the incentive compatible and ex-ante welfare maximizing (i.e. utilitarian) mechanism for settings with an arbitrary number of agents and alternatives where the privately informed agents have single-crossing and single-peaked preferences. The optimal outcome can be implemented by modifying a sequential voting scheme that is used in many legislatures and committees. The modification uses a flexible majority threshold for each of several alternatives, and allows us to replicate, via a single sequential procedure, the entire class of anonymous, unanimous, and dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms. Our analysis relies on elegant characterizations of this class of mechanisms for single-peaked and single-crossing preferences.