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最新文章

• Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types AI翻译
  作者：Compte, Olivier; Jehiel, Philippe
  作者单位：University of London; University College London
  摘要：We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to outside options, the size of the pie is commonly known and each party privately knows the realization of her outside option. We allow for correlations in the distributions of outside options. Parties have a veto right, which allows them to obtain at least their outside option payoff in any event. Besides, agents can receive no subsidy ex post. We show that inefficiencies are inevitable whatever the exact form of correlation, as lo...
• The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory AI翻译
  作者：Carrillo, Juan D.; Palfrey, Thomas R.
  作者单位：University of Southern California; California Institute of Technology
  摘要：We analyze a game of two-sided private information where players have privately known strengths and can decide to fight or compromise. If either chooses to fight, the stronger player receives a high payoff and the weaker player receives a low payoff If both choose to compromise, each player receives an intermediate payoff The only equilibrium is for players to always fight. In our experiment, we observe frequent compromise, more fighting the lower the compromise pay if and less fighting by fir...
• Like Father, Like Son: Social Network Externalities and Parent-Child Correlation in Behavior AI翻译
  作者：Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Jackson, Matthew O.
  作者单位：Stanford University
  摘要：We build an overlapping generations model where an individual sees higher returns to adopting a behavior as many neighbors adopt the behavior. We show that overlap in the state of a parent and child's neighborhood can lead to correlation in parent-child behavior independent of any parent-child interaction. Increasing the sensitivity of individual decisions to the state of their social community leads to increased parent-child correlation and less efficient (more costly) behavior on average in ...
• Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene AI翻译
  作者：Jin, Ginger Zhe; Leslie, Phillip
  作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Stanford University
  摘要：How can consumers be assured that firms will endeavor to provide good quality when quality is unobservable prior to purchase? We test the hypothesis that reputational incentives are effective at causing restavrants to maintain good hygiene quality,. We find that chain affiliation provides reputational incentives and franchised units tend to free-ride on chain reputation. We also show that regional variation in the degree of repeat customers affects the strength of reputational incentives for g...
• Contracting with Third Parties AI翻译
  作者：Baliga, Sandeep; Sjoestroem, Tomas
  作者单位：Northwestern University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
  摘要：In bilateral holdup and moral hazard in teams models, introducing a third party allows implementation of the first best, even if renegotiation is possible. Fines paid to the third party provide incentives for truth-telling and investment. This result holds even if the third party is corruptible, as long as the grand coalition has access to the same contracting technology as any colluding subcoalition. (JEL D86, D82)
• Moral Hazard and Customer Loyalty Programs AI翻译
  作者：Basso, Leonardo J.; Clements, Matthew T.; Ross, Thomas W.
  作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Saint Edward's University; University of British Columbia
  摘要：Frequent flier plans (FFPs) may be the most famous of customer loyalty programs, and there are similar schemes in other industries. We present a theory that models FFPs as efforts to exploit the agency relations up between employers (who pay for tickets) and employees (who book travel). FFPs bribe employees to book flights at higher prices. While a single airline offering an FFP has an advantage, competing FFPs can result in lower profits for airlines even while ticket prices rise. Thus, in co...
• Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets AI翻译
  作者：Ambrus, Attila; Argenziano, Rossella
  作者单位：Harvard University; University of Essex
  摘要：This paper investigates pricing decisions and network choices in two-sided markets with network externalities. Consumers are heterogeneous in how much they value the externality. Imposing restrictions on the extent of coordination failure among consumers generates clear qualitative conclusions about equilibrium market configurations. Multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium, both in the case of a monopolist network provider and in the case of competing providers. These equilibri...