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作者：Bernheim, B. Douglas
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：This paper attempts to identify and articulate the specific ways in which the emerging field of neuroeconomics might shed light on traditional positive and normative questions in economics, as well as the likely limitations of its potential contributions. It sets forth both reservations and reasons for guarded optimism.
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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：We study the revenue-maximizing allocation of several heterogeneous, commonly ranked objects to impatient agents with privately known characteristics who arrive sequentially. There is a deadline after which no more objects can be allocated. We first characterize implementable allocation schemes, and compute the expected revenue for any implementable, deterministic and Markovian allocation policy. The revenue-maximizing policy is obtained by a variational argument which sheds more light on its ...
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作者：Compte, Olivier; Jehiel, Philippe
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to outside options, the size of the pie is commonly known and each party privately knows the realization of her outside option. We allow for correlations in the distributions of outside options. Parties have a veto right, which allows them to obtain at least their outside option payoff in any event. Besides, agents can receive no subsidy ex post. We show that inefficiencies are inevitable whatever the exact form of correlation, as lo...
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作者：Carrillo, Juan D.; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：University of Southern California; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We analyze a game of two-sided private information where players have privately known strengths and can decide to fight or compromise. If either chooses to fight, the stronger player receives a high payoff and the weaker player receives a low payoff If both choose to compromise, each player receives an intermediate payoff The only equilibrium is for players to always fight. In our experiment, we observe frequent compromise, more fighting the lower the compromise pay if and less fighting by fir...
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作者：Rustichini, Aldo
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：This note tries to state, precisely, the method of neuroecomics, and is based on the discussion in B. Douglas Bernheim's (2009) appraisal. We claim that the theory formulates hypotheses modeling the choice process as an algorithmic procedure. The hypothesis of the algorithmic procedure imposes restriction on the neural processes implementing it, and, so, a joint test of the hypothesis based on behavioral and neural data is possible, increasing the statistical and the explanatory power of the t...
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作者：Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Jackson, Matthew O.
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We build an overlapping generations model where an individual sees higher returns to adopting a behavior as many neighbors adopt the behavior. We show that overlap in the state of a parent and child's neighborhood can lead to correlation in parent-child behavior independent of any parent-child interaction. Increasing the sensitivity of individual decisions to the state of their social community leads to increased parent-child correlation and less efficient (more costly) behavior on average in ...
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作者：Sobel, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper comments on On the Potential of Neuroeconomics: A Critical (but Hopeful) Appraisal by B. Douglas Bernheim.
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作者：Jin, Ginger Zhe; Leslie, Phillip
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Stanford University
摘要：How can consumers be assured that firms will endeavor to provide good quality when quality is unobservable prior to purchase? We test the hypothesis that reputational incentives are effective at causing restavrants to maintain good hygiene quality,. We find that chain affiliation provides reputational incentives and franchised units tend to free-ride on chain reputation. We also show that regional variation in the degree of repeat customers affects the strength of reputational incentives for g...
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作者：Chatterjee, Kalyan; Krishna, R. Vijay
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We consider the following two-period problem of self-control. In the first period, an individual has to decide on the set of feasible choices from which she will select one in the second period. In the second period, the individual might choose an alternative that she would find inferior in the first period, an eventuality that need not occur with certainty. We propose a model for this problem and axioms for first-period preferences, in which the second-period choice could be interpreted as be...
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作者：Baliga, Sandeep; Sjoestroem, Tomas
作者单位：Northwestern University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：In bilateral holdup and moral hazard in teams models, introducing a third party allows implementation of the first best, even if renegotiation is possible. Fines paid to the third party provide incentives for truth-telling and investment. This result holds even if the third party is corruptible, as long as the grand coalition has access to the same contracting technology as any colluding subcoalition. (JEL D86, D82)
