Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jin, Ginger Zhe; Leslie, Phillip
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.1.237
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 237-267
• 关键词: quality; MARKET; price; INFORMATION; ECONOMICS; form

摘要

How can consumers be assured that firms will endeavor to provide good quality when quality is unobservable prior to purchase? We test the hypothesis that reputational incentives are effective at causing restavrants to maintain good hygiene quality,. We find that chain affiliation provides reputational incentives and franchised units tend to free-ride on chain reputation. We also show that regional variation in the degree of repeat customers affects the strength of reputational incentives for good hygiene at both chain and nonchain restaurants. Despite these incentives, a policy intervention in the form of posted hygiene grade cards causes significant improvements in restaurant hygiene. (JEL I18, I19, L14, L83).