Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Compte, Olivier; Jehiel, Philippe
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.1.182
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 182-206
• 关键词: efficient mechanisms; INFORMATION; extraction; surplus

摘要

We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to outside options, the size of the pie is commonly known and each party privately knows the realization of her outside option. We allow for correlations in the distributions of outside options. Parties have a veto right, which allows them to obtain at least their outside option payoff in any event. Besides, agents can receive no subsidy ex post. We show that inefficiencies are inevitable whatever the exact form of correlation, as long as private information is dispersed. We also illustrate how veto constraints differ from ex post participation constraints. (JEL C78, D82)