The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carrillo, Juan D.; Palfrey, Thomas R.
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.1.151
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 151-181
• 关键词: guessing games; equilibrium; INFORMATION; auctions; TRADE; curse; MODEL

摘要

We analyze a game of two-sided private information where players have privately known strengths and can decide to fight or compromise. If either chooses to fight, the stronger player receives a high payoff and the weaker player receives a low payoff If both choose to compromise, each player receives an intermediate payoff The only equilibrium is for players to always fight. In our experiment, we observe frequent compromise, more fighting the lower the compromise pay if and less fighting by first than second movers. We explore several theories of cognitive limitations in an attempt to understand these anomalous findings. (JEL C91, D82)