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作者：Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper studies multiprize contests in which players' costs need not be strictly increasing in their performance. Such costs accommodate various types of asymmetries, including head starts. Head starts capture incumbency advantages, prior investments, and technological differences. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly-dominated strategies, and apply it to study multiprize all-pay auctions with head starts. A comparison to the st...
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作者：Hendel, Igal; Lizzeri, Alessandro; Roketskiy, Nikita
作者单位：Northwestern University; New York University; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper develops a model of nonlinear pricing of storable goods. We show that storability imposes novel constraints on a monopolist's ability to extract surplus. We then show that the attempt to relax these constraints can generate cyclical patterns in pricing and sales, even when consumers are homogeneous. Thus, the model provides a novel explanation for sales that does not rely on discriminating heterogeneous consumers. Enriching the model to allow for buyer heterogeneity in storage techn...
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作者：Iozzi, Alberto; Valletti, Tommaso
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of London; University of London School Oriental & African Studies (SOAS); Imperial College London
摘要：We study a set of bilateral Nash bargaining problems between an upstream input supplier and several differentiated but competing retailers. If one bilateral bargain fails, the supplier can sell to the other retailers. We show that, in a disagreement, the other retailers' behavior has a dramatic impact on the supplier's outside options and, therefore, on input prices and welfare. We revisit the countervailing buyer power hypothesis and obtain results in stark contrast with previous findings, de...
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作者：Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; North Carolina State University
摘要：The traditional literature on kidney exchange assumes that all components of the exchange must occur simultaneously. Unfortunately, the number of operating rooms required for concurrent surgeries poses a significant constraint on the beneficial exchanges that may be attained. The basic insight of this paper is that incentive compatibility does not require simultaneous exchange; rather, it requires that organ donation occurs no later than the associated organ receipt. Using sequential exchanges...
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作者：Bar, Talia; Gordon, Sidartha
作者单位：University of Connecticut; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：We study mechanisms for selecting up to m out of n projects. Project managers' private information on quality is elicited through transfers. Under limited liability, the optimal mechanism selects projects that maximize some function of the project's observable and reported characteristics. When all reported qualities exceed their own project-specific thresholds, the selected set only depends on observable characteristics, not reported qualities. Each threshold is related to (i) the outside opt...
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作者：Robbett, Andrea
作者单位：Middlebury College
摘要：This paper studies the dynamics by which populations with heterogeneous preferences for public good provision sort themselves into communities. I conduct laboratory experiments to consider which institutions best facilitate efficient self-organization when residents can move freely between locations. I find that institutions requiring all residents of a community to pay equal taxes enable subjects to sort into stable, homogeneous communities. Though sorted, residents often fail to attain the p...
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作者：Sampson, Thomas
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper analyzes how intra-industry trade affects the wage distribution when both workers and firms are heterogeneous. Positive assortative matching between worker skill and firm technology generates an employer size-wage premium and an exporter wage premium. Fixed export costs cause the selection of advanced technology, high-skill firms into exporting, and trade shifts the firm technology distribution upwards. Consequently, trade increases skill demand and wage inequality in all countries,...
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作者：Eswaran, Mukesh; Neary, Hugh M.
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We model the emergence of an innate, biological sense of property rights where resource scarcity and output contestability reign. Preferences evolve such that, in evolutionarily stable equilibrium, an object is valued more by an individual who possesses it, or has produced it, than if he is neither possessor nor producer. In a distributional contest for the object, the possessor/producer will devote more effort to retaining it than an interloper will to expropriating it. Asymmetry in preferenc...
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作者：Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of London; University College London
摘要：I present a simple framework for modeling two-firm market competition when consumer choice is frame-dependent, and firms use costless marketing messages to influence the consumer's frame. This framework embeds several recent models in the behavioral industrial organization literature. I identify a property that consumer choice may satisfy, which extends the concept of Weighted Regularity due to Piccione and Spiegler (2012), and provide a characterization of Nash equilibria under this property....
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作者：van der Weele, Joel J.; Kulisa, Julija; Kosfeld, Michael; Friebel, Guido
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We provide the second mover in a trust game and a moonlighting game with an excuse for not reciprocating. While this type of manipulation has been shown to strongly reduce giving in the dictator game, we find that the availability of the excuse has no effect on the incidence of reciprocal behavior in these games. Our results cast doubt on the generalizability of previous dictator game findings and suggest that image concerns are not a key driver of reciprocal behavior.
