Local Institutions and the Dynamics of Community Sorting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Robbett, Andrea
• 署名单位: Middlebury College
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.3.136
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 136-156
• 关键词: tiebout; equilibrium; EXISTENCE; economies; CHOICE; feet

摘要

This paper studies the dynamics by which populations with heterogeneous preferences for public good provision sort themselves into communities. I conduct laboratory experiments to consider which institutions best facilitate efficient self-organization when residents can move freely between locations. I find that institutions requiring all residents of a community to pay equal taxes enable subjects to sort into stable, homogeneous communities. Though sorted, residents often fail to attain the provision level best suited for them. When residents can vote for local tax policies with ballots, along with their feet, each community converges to the most efficient outcome for its population.