Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cooper, David J.; Kuehn, Kai-Uwe
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of East Anglia; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.2.247
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 247-278
• 关键词: infinitely repeated games; COOPERATION; BEHAVIOR; equilibria; PUNISHMENT; promises; play

摘要

We study the effect of communication in an experimental game where cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play if players share an understanding that cheating will be punished. Consistent with communication acting as a coordinating device, credible preplay threats to punish cheating are the most effective message to facilitate collusion. Promises to collude also improve cooperation. Credible threats do not occur in a treatment with a limited message space that permits threats of punishment. Contrary to some theoretical predictions, renegotiation possibilities facilitate collusion.