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作者：Drugov, Mikhail; Macchiavello, Rocco
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Warwick
摘要：Entrepreneurs must experiment to learn how good they are at a new activity. What happens when the experimentation is financed by a lender? Under common scenarios, i.e., when there is the opportunity to learn by starting small or when noncompete clauses cannot be enforced ex post, we show that financing experimentation can become harder precisely when it is more profitable, i.e., for lower values of the known arm and for more optimistic priors. Endogenous collateral requirements (like those fre...
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作者：Quint, Daniel
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Several recent technological standards were accompanied by patent pools-arrangements to license relevant intellectual property as a package. A key distinction made by regulators-between patents essential to a standard and patents with substitutes-has not been addressed in the theoretical literature. I show that pools of essential patents are always welfare increasing, while pools which include nonessential patents can be welfare reducing-even pools limited to complementary patents and stable u...
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作者：Bar-Isaac, Heski; Deb, Joyee
作者单位：University of Toronto; Yale University
摘要：We present a model in which an agent takes actions to affect her reputation with two audiences with diverse preferences. This contrasts with standard reputation models that consider a homogeneous audience. A new aspect that arises is that different audiences may observe outcomes commonly or separately. We show that, if all audiences commonly observe outcomes, reputation concerns are necessarily efficient-the agent's per-period payoff in the long run is higher than in one-shot play. However, wh...
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作者：Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：In most variants of the Hotelling-Downs model of election, it is assumed that voters have concave utility functions. This assumption is arguably justified in issues such as economic policies, but convex utilities are perhaps more appropriate in others, such as moral or religious issues. In this paper, we analyze the implications of convex utility functions in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model with a polarized voter distribution. We show that the equilibrium policies diverge if and onl...
