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作者：Alonso, Ricardo; Dessein, Wouter; Matouschek, Niko
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Columbia University; Northwestern University
摘要：We examine the relationship between the organization of a multi-divisional firm and its ability to adapt production decisions to changes in the environment. We show that even if lower-level managers have superior information about local conditions, and incentive conflicts are negligible, a centralized organization can be better at adapting to local information than a decentralized one. As a result, and in contrast to what is commonly argued, an increase in product market competition that makes...
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作者：Li, Tong; Zhang, Bingyu
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Freddie Mac
摘要：We study the effects of mergers in timber sale auctions in Oregon. We propose an entry and bidding model within the affiliated private value (APV) framework and with heterogeneous bidders, and establish existence of the entry equilibrium and existence and uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium when the joint distribution of private values belongs to the class of Archimedean copulas. We estimate the resulting structural model, and study merger effects through counterfactual analyses using the st...
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作者：Einav, Liran; Kuchler, Theresa; Levin, Jonathan; Sundaresan, Neel
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University; eBay Inc.
摘要：We use data from eBay to identify hundreds of thousands of instances in which retailers posted otherwise identical product listings with targeted variation in pricing and auction design. We use these matched listings to measure the dispersion in auction prices for identical goods sold by the same seller, to estimate nonparametric auction demand curves, to analyze the effect of buy it now options, and to assess consumer sensitivity to shipping fees. The scale of the data allows us to show that ...
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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We analyze preferences over redistribution in societies with costly (positive) sorting according to income. We identify a new motivation for redistribution, where individuals support taxation in order to reduce the incentives to sort. We characterize a simple condition over income distributions which implies that even relatively rich voters with income above the mean-will prefer full equality (and thus no sorting) to societies with costly sorting. We show that the condition is satisfied for re...
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作者：Francetich, Alejandro
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper addresses the problem of sequentially allocating time-sensitive goods, or one-period leases on a durable good, among agents who compete through time and learn about the common component of their valuation privately through experience. I show that efficiency is unattainable, and I identify simple variations of sequential second-price or English auctions that implement the second best and the revenue-maximizing auctions. When the units are divisible, I identify the corresponding aucti...
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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; University of Leicester
摘要：In this paper we analyze a principal's optimal monitoring strategies in a team environment. In doing so we study the interaction between formal monitoring and informal (peer) monitoring. We show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, peer monitoring substitutes for the principal's monitoring. However, if the technology satisfies substitution, the principal's optimal monitoring is independent of the peer monitoring. We also show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, then ...
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作者：Boleslavsky, Raphael; Cotton, Christopher
作者单位：University of Miami; Queens University - Canada
摘要：We consider school competition in a Bayesian persuasion framework. Schools compete to place graduates by investing in education quality and by choosing grading policies. In equilibrium, schools strategically adopt grading policies that do not perfectly reveal graduate ability to evaluators. We compare outcomes when schools grade strategically to outcomes when evaluators perfectly observe graduate ability. With strategic grading, grades are less informative, and evaluators rely less on grades a...
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作者：Forbes, Silke J.; Lederman, Mara; Tombe, Trevor
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; University of Toronto; University of Calgary
摘要：Disclosure programs exist in many industries in which consumers are poorly informed about product quality. We study a disclosure program for airline on-time performance, which ranks airlines based on the fraction of their flights that arrive less than 15 minutes late. The program creates incentives for airlines to focus their efforts on flights close to this threshold. We find that firms in this industry are heterogeneous in how they respond to these incentives. Moreover, this heterogeneity co...
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作者：Karle, Heiko; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Peitz, Martin
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Mannheim; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We analyze a consumer-choice model with price uncertainty, loss aversion, and expectation-based reference points. The implications of this model are tested in an experiment in which participants have to make a consumption choice between two sandwiches. Participants differ in their reported taste for the two sandwiches and in their degree of loss aversion, which we measure separately. We find that more-loss-averse participants are more likely to opt for the cheaper sandwich, in line with theore...
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作者：Shadmehr, Mehdi; Bernhardt, Dan
作者单位：University of Miami; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Warwick
摘要：We characterize a ruler's decision of whether to censor media reports that convey information to citizens who decide whether to revolt. We find: (i) a ruler gains (his ex ante expected payoff increases) by committing to censoring slightly less than he does in equilibrium: his equilibrium calculations ignore that censoring less causes citizens to update more positively following no news; (ii) a ruler gains from higher censorship costs if and only if censorship costs exceed a critical threshold;...
