Grading Standards and Education Quality
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Boleslavsky, Raphael; Cotton, Christopher
署名单位：
University of Miami; Queens University - Canada
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7669
DOI：
10.1257/mic.20130080
发表日期：
2015
页码：
248-279
关键词：
摘要：
We consider school competition in a Bayesian persuasion framework. Schools compete to place graduates by investing in education quality and by choosing grading policies. In equilibrium, schools strategically adopt grading policies that do not perfectly reveal graduate ability to evaluators. We compare outcomes when schools grade strategically to outcomes when evaluators perfectly observe graduate ability. With strategic grading, grades are less informative, and evaluators rely less on grades and more on a school's quality when assessing graduates. Consequently, under strategic grading, schools have greater incentive to invest in quality, and this can improve evaluator welfare.
来源URL：