Formal versus Informal Monitoring in Teams

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gershkov, Alex; Winter, Eyal
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; University of Leicester
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130277
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 27-44
• 关键词: transparency; partnerships; EFFICIENCY; incentives; agents

摘要

In this paper we analyze a principal's optimal monitoring strategies in a team environment. In doing so we study the interaction between formal monitoring and informal (peer) monitoring. We show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, peer monitoring substitutes for the principal's monitoring. However, if the technology satisfies substitution, the principal's optimal monitoring is independent of the peer monitoring. We also show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, then the principal in the optimal contracts will monitor more closely than in the case of substitution.