Distributional Preferences, Reciprocity-Like Behavior, and Efficiency in Bilateral Exchange

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benjamin, Daniel J.
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20120109
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 70-98
• 关键词: inequality aversion; Maximin preferences; fairness; THEOREM; equity

摘要

Under what conditions do distributional preferences, such as altruism or a concern for fair outcomes, generate efficient trade? I analyze theoretically a simple bilateral exchange game: each player sequentially takes an action that reduces his own material payoff but increases the other player's. Each player's preferences may depend on both his/her own material payoff and the other player's. I identify two key properties of the second-mover's preferences: indifference curves kinked around fair material-payoff distributions, and materials payoffs entering preferences as normal goods. Either property can drive reciprocity-like behavior and generate a Pareto efficient outcome.