A Continuous-Time Model of Multilateral Bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ambrus, Attila; Lu, Shih En
• 署名单位: Duke University; Simon Fraser University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20100029
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 208-249
• 关键词: coalition-formation; perfect equilibrium; Markov equilibria; majority-rule; games; externalities; division; CHOICE; offers; delay

摘要

We propose a finite-horizon continuous-time framework for coalitional bargaining, in which players can make offers at random discrete times. In our model: (i) expected payoffs in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) are unique, generating sharp predictions and facilitating comparative statics; and (ii) MPE are the only subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) that can be approximated by SPNE of nearby discrete-time bargaining models. We investigate the limit MPE payoffs as the time horizon goes to infinity and players get infinitely patient. In convex games, we establish that the set of these limit payoffs achievable by varying recognition rates is exactly the core of the characteristic function.