Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marx, Leslie M.; Mezzetti, Claudio; Marshall, Robert C.
• 署名单位: Duke University; University of Queensland; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140054
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 205-240
• 关键词: programs; cartels; FIRMS

摘要

We use a global games approach to model alternative implementations of an antitrust leniency program as applied to multiproduct colluders. We derive several policy design lessons; e.g., we show that it is possible that linking leniency across products increases the likelihood of conviction in the first product investigated but reduces it in subsequent products. Thus, firms may have an incentive to form sacrificial cartels and apply for leniency in less valuable products to reduce convictions in more valuable products. Cartel profiling can mitigate this undesirable effect, but also reduces the probability of conviction in the first product investigated.