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作者：Burguet, Roberto
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：I investigate the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the presence of corruption. After contracting with the sponsor, the contractor may bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality. The mechanism affects whether bribery occurs. I discuss the cases of both fixed and variable (with the size of misrepresentation) bribes, and also uncertainty about the bribe amount. In all cases, the optimal contract curtails quality for low efficiency contractors but also for the most efficient contractor...
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作者：Xefteris, Dimitrios; Ziros, Nicholas
作者单位：University of Cyprus
摘要：This paper studies decentralized vote trading in a power sharing system that follows the rules of strategic market games. In particular, we study a two-party election in which prior to the voting stage, voters are free to trade votes for money. Voters hold private information about both their ordinal and cardinal preferences, whereas their utilities are proportionally increasing in the vote share of their favorite party. In this framework, we prove generic existence of a unique full trade equi...
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作者：Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hulya
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Rice University
摘要：A party in power can address a limited number of issues. What issues to address-the party's agenda-has dynamic implications because it affects what issues will be addressed in the future. We analyze a model in which the incumbent addresses one issue among many and the remaining issues roll over to the next period. We show that no strategic manipulation arises without checks and balances and identify strategic manipulations in the forms of waiting for the moment, seizing the moment, steering, a...
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作者：Staiger, Robert W.; Sykes, Alan O.
作者单位：Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The non-violation clause of GATT is Exhibit A for the proposition that international trade agreements are incomplete contracts. According to the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements, it underpins the success of the GATT/WTO's shallow integration approach. Yet the observed role of the non-violation complaint is minimal. We develop a model of non-violation claims in trade agreements, demonstrate that it predicts a minimal on-equilibrium-path role for non-violation claims under reasonable pa...
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作者：Bergstrom, Ted
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：This paper studies a version of the Volunteer's Dilemma in which players sequentially observe someone in trouble and decide whether to help. Where preferences are identical, we show that if the frequency with which potential helpers appear is above some threshold, then as frequency of appearance increases, the probability that any individual stops diminishes, but the expected waiting time for help to appear is constant. Where costs of stopping differ among individuals, as the frequency of appe...
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作者：Esponda, Ignacio; Pouzo, Demian
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We introduce a solution concept in the context of large elections with private information by embedding a model of boundedly rational voters into an otherwise standard equilibrium setting. A retrospective voting equilibrium (RVE) formalizes the idea that voters evaluate alternatives based on past performance. Since counterfactual outcomes are not observed, the sample from which voters learn is potentially biased, leading to systematically biased beliefs in equilibrium. We provide an explicit l...
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作者：Sautmann, Anja
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This paper considers a matching market with two-sided search and transferable utility where match payoffs depend on age at marriage (time until match) and search is finite. We define and prove existence of equilibrium, and provide sufficient conditions for positive assortative matching that build on restricting the slope and curvature of the marriage payoff function to generate single-peaked preferences in age and therefore convex matching sets. Payoff functions that are incompatible with posi...
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作者：Weyl, E. Glen; Veiga, Andre
作者单位：Yale University; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：To mitigate adverse selection in insurance markets, individuals are often mandated to buy at least a baseline plan, but may choose to opt into a premium plan. In some markets, such as US health exchanges, each plan is responsible for the full expenses of those who buy it ( total pricing). In other markets, such as the privately supplied Medigap top-ups to traditional government-provided Medicare, premium providers are only responsible for the incremental expenses they top up ( incremental pric...
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作者：Goto, Masahiro; Kojima, Fuhito; Kurata, Ryoji; Tamura, Akihisa; Yokoo, Makoto
作者单位：Kyushu University; Stanford University; Keio University
摘要：To handle various applications, we study matching under constraints. The only requirement on the constraints is heredity; given a feasible matching, any matching with fewer students at each school is also feasible. Heredity subsumes existing constraints such as regional maximum quotas and diversity constraints. With constraints, there may not exist a matching that satisfies fairness and nonwastefulness (i. e., stability). We demonstrate our new mechanism, the Adaptive Deferred Acceptance mecha...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Severinov, Sergei
作者单位：Columbia University; University of British Columbia
摘要：This paper examines how the advice that lawyers provide to their clients affects the disclosure of evidence and the outcome of adjudication, and how the adjudicator should allocate the burden of proof in light of these effects. Despite lawyers' expertise in assessing the evidence, their advice is found to have no effect on adjudication if the lawyers follow the strategies of disclosing all favorable evidence. A lawyer's advice can influence the outcome in his client's favor, either if (s) he c...
