作者：Ashworth, Scott; de Mesquita, Ethan Bueno; Friedenberg, Amanda
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Chicago; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Elections are thought to improve voter welfare through two channels: effective accountability (i.e., providing incentives for politicians to take costly effort) and electoral selection (i.e., retaining politicians with characteristics voters value). We show that there may be a trade-off between these two channels. Higher levels of effective accountability may hinder the voters' ability to learn about the politicians. In turn, this may hinder electoral selection and be detrimental to voter welf...
作者：Monzon, Ignacio
作者单位：Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：A continuum of homogeneous rational agents choose between two competing technologies. Agents observe a private signal and sample others' previous choices. Signals have an aggregate component of uncertainty, so aggregate behavior does not necessarily reflect the true state of nature. Nonetheless, agents still find others' choices informative, and base their decisions partly on others' behavior. Consequently, bad choices can be perpetuated: aggregate uncertainty makes agents herd on the inferior...
