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作者：Gautier, Pieter A.; Holzner, Christian L.
作者单位：Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：We consider a model where firms open vacancies and post and commit to a wage mechanism. Search is costly and workers simultaneously apply to multiple jobs. Firms can be connected to multiple workers and workers to multiple firms. We use a new method to derive the expected maximum number of matches in a large market as a function of the number of applications and market tightness. We also derive the conditions under which firm entry, worker participation, and search intensity are socially effic...
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作者：Krishna, Kala; Sheveleva, Yelena
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Cardiff University
摘要：Why do developing countries fail to specialize in products in which they appear to have a comparative advantage? We propose a model of agricultural trade with intermediation that explains how hold up resulting from poor contracting environments can produce such an outcome. We use the model to explore the role of production subsidies, support prices, easing sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements, and the creation of local markets in resolving the hold up problem. The model highlights the...
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作者：Lizzeri, Alessandro; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：New York University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：Behavioral economics presents a paternalistic rationale for a benevolent government's intervention. We consider an economy where the only distortion is agents' time-inconsistency. We study the desirability of various forms of collective action, ones pertaining to costly commitment and ones pertaining to the timing of consumption, when government decisions respond to voters' preferences via the political process. Three messages emerge. First, welfare is highest under either full centralization ...
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作者：Baranov, Oleg; Aperjis, Christina; Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; North Carolina State University
摘要：For procuring from sellers with decreasing returns, there are known efficient dynamic auction formats. In this paper, we design an efficient dynamic procurement auction for the case where goods are homogeneous and bidders have increasing returns. Our motivating example is the procurement of vaccines, which often exhibit large fixed costs and small constant marginal costs. The auctioneer names a price and bidders report the interval of quantities that they are willing to sell at that price. The...
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作者：Bobtcheff, Catherine; Levy, Raphael
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We consider a cash-constrained firm learning on the value of an irreversible project at a privately known speed. Under perfect information, the optimal date of investment may be non-monotonic in the learning speed: better learning increases the value of experimenting further, but also the speed of updating. Under asymmetric information, the firm uses its investment timing to signal confidence in the project and raise cheaper capital from uninformed investors, which may generate timing distorti...
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作者：Kinateder, Markus; Merlino, Luca Paolo
作者单位：University of Navarra; University of Antwerp
摘要：We study a local public good game in an endogenous network with heterogeneous players. The source of heterogeneity affects the gains from a connection and hence equilibrium networks. When players differ in the cost of producing the public good, active players form pyramidal complete multipartite graphs; yet, better types need not have more neighbors. When players differ in the valuation of the public good, nested split graphs emerge in which production need not be monotonic in type. In large s...
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作者：Garcia, Daniel; Honda, Jun; Janssen, Maarten
作者单位：University of Vienna; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We study vertical relations in markets with consumer and retailer search. We obtain three important new results. First, we provide a novel explanation for price dispersion that does not depend on some form of heterogeneity among consumers. Price dispersion takes on the form of a bimodal distribution. Second, under competitive conditions (many retailers or small consumer search cost), social welfare is significantly smaller than in the double marginalization outcome. Manufacturers' regular pric...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Boston College
摘要：We study path-independent choice rules applied to a matching context. We use a classic representation of these choice rules to introduce a powerful technique for matching theory. Using this technique, we provide a deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and study its properties. Next, we obtain a compelling comparative static result: if one agent's choice expands, the remaining agents on her side of the market are made worse off, while agents on the other...
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作者：Nayeem, Omar A.
摘要：This paper explores the useful but delicate role of managerial skepticism in hierarchical knowledge-based organizations. In these settings, the decision-maker principal seeks advice from managers, who instruct expert frontline workers to acquire information. Given unverifiable information quality and private-valued agents, moral hazard and adverse selection arise with workers and managers, respectively. Pairing extremely passionate workers with moderately skeptical managers alleviates both pro...
